

**The Mind's Best Trick:
How We Experience Conscious Will**

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Summary

We often experience consciously willing our actions. This experience is so profound that it tempts us to believe that our actions are caused by consciousness. It could also be a trick, however—the mind’s way of estimating its own apparent authorship by drawing causal inferences about relationships between thoughts and actions. Cognitive, social, and neuropsychological studies of apparent mental causation suggest that experiences of conscious will frequently depart from actual causal processes and so may not reflect direct perceptions of conscious thought causing action.

The Mind’s Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will

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Does consciousness cause action? Many people think that even asking this question is absurd. How could consciousness *not* cause what we do? Every few moments of every day, we think about doing something and then do it. We think of moving a finger and then do it, we think of going to the store for milk and do it, we think of looking away from this page—and then do it. It certainly doesn’t take a rocket scientist to draw the obvious conclusion from a lifelong barrage of such examples: Consciousness is an active force, an engine of will.

The mind has been known, though, to play tricks. Could this be one? What if our minds keep showing us the same set of appearances, leading to an impression of conscious will again and again, but never revealing to us how our actions are actually caused? One way this could happen is if both the thought about action and the action itself are caused by unperceived forces of mind: You think of doing X and then do X—not because conscious thinking causes doing, but because other mental processes (that are not consciously perceived) cause both the thinking and the doing. Based on your conscious perceptions of your thoughts and actions, it would be impossible to tell in any given case whether your thought was causing your action, or something else was causing both of them. Could it be that the deep intuition we all have about the power of our conscious will is the result of this sleight of mind? Perhaps we experience conscious will when we *infer* that our thought causes our action, although we can’t really know that this is the causal path (see Fig. 1).

Anomalies of Will

If conscious will is an illusory add-on to action, we could begin to explain all the odd cases when action and conscious will do not properly coincide.

Neuropsychology. We might understand, for example, Penfield’s classic finding on movements induced through electrical stimulation of the motor cortex [1]. Conscious patients were prompted by stimulation of the exposed brain to produce movements that were not simple

reflexes and instead appeared complex, multi-staged, and voluntary. Yet, their common report of the experience was that they did not “do” the action, and instead felt that Penfield had “pulled it out” of them. This observation only makes sense if the experience of will is an *addition* to voluntary action, not a cause of it.

The possibility that conscious will is an illusion might also explain the finding that unperceived causes of action can fail to influence the experience of will [2]. People in one study, for instance, were asked to choose to move one or the other index finger whenever they heard a click [3]. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied alternately to the left or right motor strip to influence the movement, and this influence was strong at short response times. Respondents reported consciously willing the movements during the TMS influence, however, indicating a lack of insight into the alternative causal mechanism producing their actions.




Fig. 1. The experience of conscious will arises when the person infers an apparent causal path from thought to action. The actual causal paths are not present in the person’s consciousness. The thought is caused by unconscious mental events, and the action is caused by unconscious mental events, and these unconscious mental events may also be linked to each other directly or through yet other mental or brain processes. Conscious will is experienced as a result of what is apparent, not what is real. Reprinted with permission from Ref. 22.

Similar inferences can be drawn from Gazzaniga’s observations of split-brain patients who are induced to perform an action through communication to the right brain when the major verbal centers of the left brain are left unaware of the action’s cause [4]. Such patients confabulate “left brain interpretations” of their intentions, apparently to satisfy the general assumption that their actions are consciously willed.

The celebrated experiments of Benjamin Libet provide further evidence that conscious will is experienced that does not correspond to causation [5]. In spontaneous, intentional finger movement, Libet found that a scalp-recorded brain readiness potential (RP) preceded the movement (measured electromyographically) by a minimum of about 550 msec. This finding indicates only that some sort of brain activity reliably precedes the onset of voluntary action. However, participants were also asked to recall the position of a clock at their initial awareness of intending to move their finger, and this awareness *followed* the RP by some 350-400 msec. So, although the conscious intention preceded the finger movement, it occurred well after whatever brain events were signaled by the RP. This finding suggests that the experience of consciously willing an action begins after brain events that set the action into motion [6,7]. The brain creates both the thought and the action, leaving the person to infer that the thought is causing the action.

Clinical evidence. Anomalies pointing to a system that fabricates an experience of will can also be found in clinical cases. Patients with brain damage resulting in alien hand syndrome, for example, report that one of their hands functions with a mind of its own, often performing elaborate and seemingly voluntary actions without the patient's experience of willful control. One patient described the experience as a feeling that "someone from the moon" was controlling her hand [8]. Schizophrenia accompanied by auditory hallucinations also produces anomalistic will—in this case, an experience of "hearing voices" that occurs when patients attribute their own thoughts and inner voice to others [9-14]. Thoughts that come to mind without prior anticipation are not experienced as willed, and their insistent recurrence can lead patients to ascribe them to outside agents.

Automatisms. Will is also experienced independently of action in a menagerie of cases known as automatisms [15-19]. Practices such as automatic writing, table turning, Ouija-board spelling, dowsing, pendulum divining, channeling, and the like were the major psychological basis of the Spiritualist fad of the late 19th century, as these various contrivances gave rise to experiences of unwilled action that were then attributed to spirits or other supernatural agents. In the case of table turning, for instance, a group of people gathered around a light table and waited for it to move (see Fig. 2). Often it would—after a significant wait—sometimes even circling the room or rocking side to side. Yet the participants often reported no experience of willing the action and instead expressed amazement at the table's animation. Although spirit agency was the popular explanation, investigations by scientists such as Michael Faraday (using force measurement devices between hands and tables) revealed that the source of the table movement was indeed the participants [20]. The experience of will in such cases was entirely misleading about the causal basis of the action.

Apparent Mental Causation

If the experience of conscious will is not a direct report of the processes whereby action is produced, what is it? The likely sources of the experience of conscious will are the topic of the *theory of apparent mental causation* [19,21].

Principles. This theory suggests that conscious will is experienced when we draw the inference that our thought has caused our action—whether or not this inference is correct. The

inference occurs in accord with principles that follow from research on cause perception and attribution [22-26]—principles of *priority*, *consistency*, and *exclusivity*. When a thought appears in consciousness just before an action (priority), is consistent with the action (consistency), and is not accompanied by salient alternative causes of the action (exclusivity), we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. In essence, we experience ourselves as agents who consciously cause our actions when our minds provide us with timely previews of actions that turn out to be accurate when we observe the actions that ensue. Elements of this theory can be traced to David Hume, and can be understood as an application of his general analysis of the perception of causality [27].

In commonplace actions, we often have thoughts of action that are consistent, prior, and exclusive. We think of turning on a light before doing so, for example, and nothing else seems to be causing the light to go on, so when it happens we conclude that we did it. If we were not thinking of turning on the light and found ourselves flipping the switch, the lack of consistency



Fig. 2. Parisians in 1853 test the automatic turning of a piano stool [28].

between our thought and action might undermine the feeling of conscious will for the action. If we thought of turning on the light only *after* the action, the lack of appropriate priority could also yield little sense of will for the action. And if we saw someone's hand on a parallel switch at the

other door to the room, we might be inclined to feel less conscious will for the light's turning on even if we had thought of doing it just in advance of our own movement.

Illusory will. Imagine for a moment that a consistent thought occurs prior to an action, and that the thought is not accompanied by any other potential causes of action—but that it does *not* cause the action. One might still perceive it as causal nonetheless. On thinking of the light switching on just before it actually comes on, for example, one might have the distinct but erroneous impression that one had caused it. The principles of causal inference do not describe actual causal relations, then, because the perceptions of causality that derive from the principles can depart from reality [29]. When inferences diverge from actual causal sequences, the experience of conscious will goes awry, leaving the person to experience authorship of actions that could not have been the person's, or that may not even have occurred—or to experience no authorship even when the action is demonstrably linked to the person [30]. Departures from veridical perceptions of causality can be traced for each of the principles.

The consistency principle, for example, suggests the general proposition that people will feel more will for success than failure. After all, people more often envision success of a task than failure, so when success occurs, the consistency between the prior thought and the observed action produces an experience of will. Such effects have been observed in studies of the perceived contingency between actions and outcomes. People perceive that they controlled a chance event when they receive a large number of initial successes in predicting that event [31]. The perception that one is causing a successful outcome is enhanced merely by the increased frequency of that outcome [32]. And it makes sense, then, that depressed individuals—who think less often of success—are not as likely as others to over-perceive control of successful outcomes [33].

The priority principle carries with it further implications for the experience of will. It suggests, for instance, that people will think they have caused actions when a thought relevant to the action is primed just prior to the action—whether they actually performed the action or not. People in one experiment were presented with thoughts (e.g., a tape-recorded mention of the word *swan*) relevant to their action (moving an onscreen cursor to select a picture of a swan) [21]. The movement that participants performed was not their own, as they shared the computer mouse with an experimental confederate who gently forced the action without the participants' knowledge. (And on other trials, the effect of the thought on the participant's own action was found to be nil when the action was not forced.) Nevertheless, when the relevant thought was provided either 1 s or 5 s before the action, participants reported feeling that they acted intentionally in making the movement. The influence of priority was observed because, on trials when thoughts of the swan were prompted 30 s before the forced action or 1 s afterward, no inflated experience of will was found. Even when the thought of the action is wholly external—appearing as in this case over headphones—its timely appearance before the action led to an enhanced experience of apparent mental causation.

The exclusivity principle governs cases when perceptions of forces outside the self undermine the experience of will. The presence of other actors who may contribute to the action, for instance, creates circumstances in which people can fail to sense willful control of their actions. In the case of hypnosis, the experience of performing suggested actions gives many

susceptible individuals strong impressions of involuntariness despite their obvious involvement in acting [34]. Stanley Milgram explained his finding that people will obey a command to shock another person in terms of such a mechanism, suggesting that an “agentic shift” and an accompanying reduction in conscious will occur when actions done at the behest of another [35].

At the extreme, perceptions of other agents can obliterate the experience of authorship of one’s own action. In a series of studies, people who were asked to sense the ostensible muscle movements of another person and type answers to questions for that person were found to produce correct answers and attribute a substantial contribution to the other, even when the other was an experimental confederate who never heard the questions [36]. This phenomenon appears to underlie facilitated communication, the discredited technique whereby people giving manual support to autistic or other communication-impaired individuals create typed messages that they erroneously attribute to those individuals [37]. The belief in outside agents who influence a person’s actions may so muddle the perception of conscious will as to promote bizarre dissociations of perceived authorship in the form of trance channeling, spirit possession, and dissociative identity disorder [19].

Questions for future research

- How do the consistency, priority, and exclusivity principles interact with each other to influence conscious will?
- Does the experience of conscious will operate by the same processes *before* action as *after* action?
- What brain activities are involved in the experience of conscious will—beyond the activities associated with the production of intention and the production of action?
- Are there ways to enhance self-insight by increasing the correspondence between apparent mental causation and actual causal processes?

Conclusions

Does all this mean that conscious thought does not cause action? It does not mean this at all. The task of determining the causal relations between conscious representations and actions is a matter of inspection through scientific inquiry, and reliable connections between conscious thought and action could potentially be discerned [38]. The point here is that the mind’s own system for computing these relations provides the person with an experience of conscious will that is no more than a rough-and-ready guide to such causation, one that may be misled by any number of circumstances that render invalid inferences. We should be surprised, after all, if cognitive creatures with our demonstrably fallible self-insight were capable of perceiving the deepest mechanisms of our own minds [39,40]. The experience of conscious will is a marvelous trick of the mind, one that yields useful intuitions about our authorship—but it is not the foundation for an explanatory system that stands outside the paths of deterministic causation.

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