

Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age.



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zens to bear arms than on any other controversial constitutional question (p. 135). Now Joyce Lee Malcolm, a specialist in English history, has journeyed across the water to explore the ancient origins of a right that English settlers carried with them to American shores. The result is a work of genuine excellence, as persuasive in its argument as it is unsettling in its implications.

Malcolm's story begins in the Middle Ages. Because of the impoverished and decentralized nature of government in medieval England, commoners and nobles alike were expected to guard their homes, neighbors, and city walls. Because of the general unhappiness with this often onerous duty, for nearly five hundred years the English stubbornly resisted transforming this responsibility into a traditional right. As England was an island nation, its monarchs were able to maintain this cheap citizen militia long after continental sovereigns turned to vast professional armies. Because gun ownership remained more a duty than a right, crown and Parliament were free to limit the ownership of certain kinds of weapons, such as the crossbow and handgun, which might be used in highway robberies. Oliver Cromwell's government restricted the ability of Catholics to carry weapons, and during the Restoration Parliament clamped down on the privilege of owning firearms to inhibit poaching and to prevent, as William Blackstone conceded, "popular insurrections and resistance to the government" (p. 12).

The number of guns had risen dramatically during the Civil War, as both sides manufactured weapons and civilians purchased guns to guard their lives and property. Disarming the population under the Game Acts of 1671 was thus easier said than done. Many soldiers had deserted with their weapons, and during the war armaments could easily be found littering battlefields. Local justices were reluctant to convict gun offenders whose imprisonment might leave their families without means of support, and thus a financial burden on the parish. James II was only partially successful in his political use of disarmament, but as his policy came at the expense of parliamentary powers, it was particularly galling. Having overthrown the Catholic Stuarts and resisted their attempts to create large standing armies, the Convention Parliament of 1689 hastily retreated from the traditional notion of militia duty and finally came down squarely "in favour of an individual right of arms for [personal and political] self-defence" (p. 120). It was this mixed heritage of duty and right that English settlers carried to the colonies and at length institutionalized in the American Constitution.

Malcolm wisely declines to carry her analysis to the present. Yet I, having been convinced that the authors of the Second Amendment meant to guarantee individual gun ownership as a right as well as a duty, would have welcomed at least a brief meditation on how this eighteenth-century idea translates into the modern context. Malcolm argues, for example, that

as James Madison desired an all-inclusive citizen's militia, the theory that members of today's National Guard are the only persons entitled to bear arms has no historical foundation. But what does this ancient concept really mean in a modern society with a professional police force, a large standing army, and a democratically elected government with no despotic tendencies? But this is to quibble. Malcolm's prose is both vigorous and elegant, and occasionally even witty, a virtue rarely to be found in a constitutional treatise. This book should generate a healthy debate about the future of gun control in America.

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FRANK DOBBIN. *Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1994. Pp. xii, 262. \$39.95.

Frank Dobbin claims that most policy analysts, economic theorists, and institutional analysts err when they limit their studies to groups that hold power or universal economic laws. These scholars, he believes, do not pay sufficient attention to the role of custom and tradition in shaping national policies. He bases his argument on "two simple empirical observations" (p. 2): first, in the nineteenth century there were parallels in the United States, France, and Great Britain between the institutions developed in each for organizing economic life and those for political life; and second, each nation's emerging "industrial strategies" tended to be designed in ways similar to those of other institutions. Focusing on national railway policies between 1825 and 1900, Dobbin contends that "the very core tenets of economic efficiency and rationality . . . are products of identifiable social and historical forces rather than of extra-societal economic precepts" (p. 27).

Dobbin presents his arguments in five tightly organized chapters. In the first he offers a justification for the volume and plots the route he will follow. In the concluding chapter he reiterates his contention that one must consider custom and tradition rather than "rationalized principles" to understand "industrial rationality" (p. 231). He does not hesitate to tell the reader where he stands; many sentences begin with "I argue," "I contend," or "My point is." I find his argument convincing, not only because of his attention to historical details but also because of his fairness in evaluating competing interpretations.

In the remaining chapters, each devoted to a country, Dobbin follows an identical pattern. He describes the planning of the nation's railway system, the financing, the technical and managerial arrangements, and, finally, pricing and competition. He provides throughout numerous relevant comparisons for the reader to consider.

Railroads in the United States were planned, financed, and operated by local individuals. It was

expected that these entrepreneurs knew their community's best interests and, of course, their own. On occasion they sought and were given encouragement by local and state governments. When corruption and concentration became evident, the federal government intervened with legislation to promote competition and free markets. Local activism tempered by governmental participation was the American way.

France, with a long history of requiring its people and their wealth to serve those in power, utilized a different model. Regardless of which monarch held power, or what democratic experiment was underway, the civil bureaucracy remained the central player. Individual entrepreneurs proposed and operated the railways, but state technocrats exercised wide managerial and technical controls. Monopoly was accepted, efficiency was achieved, and a system of national routes centered on Paris resulted. This had been past practice and had served the nation well. When alterations were made, custom and tradition prevailed. This was the French way.

For Great Britain, nonintervention, or "unfettered individual initiative" (p. 158), prevailed. Individual independence was the foundation of British culture, and the role of government was minimal. Because railways were seen as a public utility, their promoters could appropriate land for their rights of way. Multiple regional service was accepted, for it was taken for granted that people would choose the most efficient line. Competition was essential and in everyone's best interest. Informed public opinion rather than legislation was seen as the best regulator. Only in concerns relating to third-class passengers—rates, facilities, and safety—did the government intervene to protect this class from exploitation. Even when changes were required in pricing and competition, individual rights remained paramount. This was the British way.

As sources Dobbin uses government reports, monographs, and journal articles; few references are made to letters or memoirs. He considers long-held interpretations of industrial policy not to discard any but to offer a useful alternative, custom and tradition, that has been neglected for too long.

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THOMAS WELSKOPP. *Arbeit und Macht im Hüttenwerk: Arbeits- und industrielle Beziehungen in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie von den 1860er bis zu den 1930er Jahren.* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Sozialgeschichte.) Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz. 1994. Pp. 799.

This book, an only slightly abbreviated version of Thomas Welskopp's dissertation, analyzes in detail how changes in the work process and in workplace power relations interacted with broader historical developments to produce the industrial-relations systems and class configuration specific to the iron and

steel industry in Germany and the United States between the 1860s and the 1930s. Concentrating on the Ruhr district and the Pittsburgh/Chicago region, Welskopp identifies, and structures his analysis around, three major types of social interaction in the workplace that appeared in both countries: the "team" system, which prevailed from the 1860s to the 1880s (part 2), the "drive" system that coincided with the shift from iron to steel production in the last decades of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century (part 3), and the "crew" system introduced around 1910 (part 4). In each case, he uses data derived from an impressive array of archival and secondary sources to describe the productive process, demonstrate how that process affected the way workers related to one another and to their superiors, and analyze how these relations in turn shaped the prospects for the emergence and success of worker organizations such as works councils, trade unions, and labor parties. Along the way, Welskopp tells us new and interesting things about a great variety of subjects, including changes in worker culture, the impact of ethnic diversity on labor-management relations, and the development of managerial ideologies.

The book's empirically based substantive sections are preceded by a lengthy theoretical introduction (part 1), in which Welskopp makes a case for a new labor history. He urges labor historians to focus their attention on the sphere of the production unit (*Betrieb*), which he defines as "an ever-changing system of work and power relations," the place where "economic, industrial and worker history intersect" (p. 25). His case study was designed to demonstrate the feasibility and fruitfulness of this approach, and in my view it succeeds. By starting with work itself, Welskopp has managed to integrate a mass of historical detail into a convincing synthesis that illuminates significant temporal, national, and sectoral aspects of industrial capitalism and helps us understand the development of modern industrial relations.

In the book's last section (part 5), Welskopp examines selected aspects of his theme from a comparative perspective and ventures a number of generalizations relevant to the wider sphere of labor and social history. Among other things, he discusses differences and similarities between Germany and America; compares the history of iron and steel production in these countries with developments elsewhere and in other branches of industry; analyzes the "dequalification" thesis associated with the labor historian Harry Braverman (*Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* [1974]); and explains the bearing of systems of workplace social relations on the development of trade-union organization, with special emphasis on the relationship between leaders and led.

Welskopp's controversial views about method, the novel way he marshals his evidence, and the wide range of topics covered mean that this case study will