=20

Good waves

If there's a link between urban crime and = immigration,=20 sociologists say, it's probably not what you think

By Drake Bennett | January 1, 2006

AMONG OTHER THINGS, 2005 was the year that the Boston Miracle = seemed to=20 become a distant memory. The storied drop in the city's murder = rate in the=20 1990s had drawn scholars, politicians, and police chiefs from = around the=20 country to observe and learn from Boston's crime-fighting prowess. = But the=20 murder rate has been climbing since it bottomed out in 1999, and = this year=20 it jumped to a 10-year high. Coming at a time when murder rates = continued=20 to fall in other big cities like Chicago and New York, the upsurge = has=20 sent local politicians scrambling for solutions, and examining = what it was=20 that worked so well last time.

To be sure, people have been dissecting and disputing the = causes of the=20 dramatic nationwide '90s decline in crime since it first showed up = as a=20 trend. Some credit innovative policing policies or tougher = sentencing,=20 others point to improving economic conditions or an aging = population,=20 still others the end of the crack epidemic.

The fact that the 1990s also saw one of the greatest influxes = of=20 immigrants in the country's history isn't often mentioned in these = discussions. Crime, it has long been assumed, is one of the = inevitable=20 costs of immigration. As George W. Grayson, a government professor = at the=20 College of William & Mary, wrote in the Washington Post opinion pages this summer, = ''the=20 evidence is overwhelming that an influx of poor immigrants-whether = Italians, Irish, or Poles in the 19th and early 20th centuries or=20 Hispanics in the late 20th and early 21st centuries-does bring = crime,=20 unruly drinking, public urination, unemployment, overcrowded = dwellings,=20 and property damage."

It may be surprising, then, to find agreement among several = leading=20 criminologists that immigration does not cause crime-and may even = reduce=20 it. None of them would argue that immigration is the most = important factor=20 everywhere, especially since the recent rise in Boston's murder = rate comes=20 as its foreign-born population continues to grow. But the = increased flow=20 of immigrants to major American cities nationwide, argues Robert = J.=20 Sampson, a Harvard sociologist and lead author of a major recent = study on=20 the topic, ''has been one of the more plausible explanations that = we've=20 seen for the decrease in the violence rate."

. . .

Skepticism about a link between increased crime and immigration = isn't=20 entirely new. Working in the 1920s and '30s, at the end of the = country's=20 last great wave of immigration, criminology pioneers Edwin = Sutherland and=20 Thorsten Sellin found that immigrants had lower crime rates than = both=20 native-born Americans and second-generation immigrants. It was = American=20 culture, Sutherland and Sellin concluded, that caused crime, and = the less=20 exposure to it one had the less likely one was to be a = criminal.

Published earlier this year, the study led by Harvard's Sampson = echoed=20 these earlier surveys. Sampson and his colleagues followed a = diverse group=20 of nearly 3,000 Chicago youths from 1995 to 2002, and found that = immigrant=20 kids were less likely than peers of similar socioeconomic = backgrounds to=20 participate in everything from gang fights to arson to purse = snatchings.=20 Not only that, but even nonimmigrant kids who happened to live in=20 immigrant neighborhoods were less likely than otherwise to be = involved in=20 violence.

Part of the explanation for this, Sampson says, is that = immigrant=20 families, while often poor, are more likely than other poor = families to=20 have stable, two-parent households, one factor widely understood = to=20 decrease the odds of violent activity.

But that didn't explain everything. In Sampson's study, simply = being a=20 first-generation immigrant, no matter what one's parents' marital = status=20 or one's education level, made one less likely to end up = committing a=20 violent crime. And while the immigrants in Sampson's sample were=20 predominantly Latino, the trend also held for the African and = Caribbean=20 immigrants he followed.

Sampson and others can only hypothesize as to why. ''New = immigrants,"=20 suggests John Hagan, a sociologist at Northwestern University, = ''tend to=20 be a self-selected group who are highly ambitious, energetic, = innovative."=20 Immigrants, it's been repeatedly found, are significantly more = likely than=20 their nonimmigrant neighbors to have jobs. Hagan suggests that = they're=20 also less likely to be interested in something as possibly ruinous = as=20 crime.

Ramiro Martinez, a sociologist at Florida International = University, has=20 come to similar conclusions by studying homicide rates among = Latino and=20 immigrant communities in Miami, El Paso, San Antonio, San Diego, = Chicago,=20 and other cities. In each, he has found immigrants heavily=20 underrepresented-especially considering their socioeconomic = status-among=20 convicted murderers. Andrew Karmen of the John Jay College of = Criminal=20 Justice has found analogous results for New York state.

In fact, Martinez points out, some of America's best-known = border towns=20 have the country's lowest murder rates. ''San Diego, for example-a = place=20 that captures the public imagination with all this concern about = losing=20 the borders to Mexico-has one of the lowest homicide rates for any = major=20 American urban area in the United States." El Paso, another city = seen as=20 bearing the brunt of the swelling ranks of illegal immigrants, = regularly=20 ranks among the country's safest cities.

. . .

There are limits to the data in these studies. For one thing, = they=20 focus on violent crime rather than property crime, which is more=20 prevalent. And little work has been done on immigration's effect = on=20 nonurban crime-perhaps understandably, since big cities both = absorb most=20 of the country's immigrants and experience most of its crime.

No studies, furthermore, have been able to determine whether = illegal=20 immigrants-who tend to loom particularly large in public fears-are = as=20 crime-averse as legal immigrants. On this front, though, = criminologists=20 have at least been able to make informed guesses. Sampson, for = example,=20 points out that 75 percent of the immigrants in his study listed=20 themselves as noncitizens. While many of those may have been in = the=20 process of applying for citizenship, a good number, he suspects, = were=20 simply illegal. And Martinez claims that he's seen very few = illegal=20 immigrants in the prison populations, homicide reports, and = detectives'=20 assessments he's studied. ''They're laying low," he says, and = committing a=20 crime would only get them noticed.

Some, however, take issue with these findings-and not just=20 anti-immigration activists. Wesley Skogan, a Northwestern = University=20 political scientist, has done detailed surveys of crime and = quality of=20 life throughout Chicago. Even when he controlled for poverty, he = found an=20 increase in the concentration of Spanish-speaking immigrants in a=20 neighborhood increased ''crime, social disorder problems, and = physical=20 decay."

In part, Skogan argues, this is because Chicago's immigrants = are=20 largely young and male, and young males are invariably the most=20 crime-prone segment of any population. In addition, he says, = immigrants,=20 especially illegal immigrants, drive up crime by serving as easy = targets=20 for what Skogan calls ''specialty gangs" who target illegals = because=20 ''they can't report crimes, and they're walking around with a lot = of=20 cash-they're called 'walking ATM machines."'

Skogan also points out that immigrant experiences vary widely,=20 especially in the second and third generation. While Chicago's = immigration=20 is largely Mexican, ''if you're talking about New York, for = example, it's=20 a more complicated mix of people coming in."

Sampson readily admits that the immigrant effect weakens with = each=20 successive generation. Like Edwin Sutherland and Thorsten Sellin, = Sampson=20 finds that the children of immigrants are more crime-prone than = their=20 parents, the third generation more crime-prone still. Why that is, = he=20 admits, is ''really the $64,000 question, that's really at the = forefront=20 of the research."

What it suggests, though, is that the causes of crime lie less = with=20 immigrants than with the country that they, like generations of = new=20 arrivals before them, are busily assimilating themselves into.

Drake Bennett is the staff writer for Ideas. E-mail drbennett@globe.com.

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