

TRADITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY

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This article analyzes the causes of criminal behavior as portrayed in the three dominant models of traditional criminology—strain, cultural deviance, and social control—from the perspective of radical criminology. Specifically, we compare these traditional models to radical theory based on three derived criteria: (1) that social class plays an important role in the traditional theory in question, (2) that the theory employs a social-structural model of crime causation, and (3) that the theory offers a materialistic interpretation of the relationship between culture and social structure. Ranging from contributions that are fully compatible to those that provide fruitful possibilities for future research, we find that traditional theories—especially macro-level social control models—converge in crucial respects with radical criminology. We conclude that the ideological differences between radicals and traditionalists, in conjunction with the former's suspicion of positivism and the latter's narrow emphasis on individual-level explanations, have obfuscated the development of an integrated, structural model of crime causation.

Our purpose in this article is to explore salient points of contact between radical and traditional theories of criminality. We are well aware that much literature points in the opposite direction, and a number of books and articles have been written that attempt to distinguish traditional from radical criminology. For example, Quinney (1977, p. 151) and others (Wright, 1973; Young, 1976; Garofalo, 1978) argue that radicals have explicit political commitments not shared by traditional criminologists (e.g., pursuit of a socialist society); Bohm (1982a, 1982b) sees the issue of value neutrality as differentiating traditional and radical criminology; Greenberg (1981, p. 3) and others (Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973; Groves, 1985) have suggested that the traditional emphasis on positivism finds disfavor among radicals; Garofalo (1978, p. 18) offers an epistemological demarcation with his observation that radical criminology "opposes the very type of knowl-

edge on which the field of criminal justice is premised: technocratic knowledge"; and virtually all radicals believe that traditional criminology neglects the larger social-structural context within which crime and delinquency are enmeshed (e.g., Colvin and Pauly, 1983; Michalowski, 1985; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1985; Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973; Greenberg, 1981).

It is clear, then, that there are important differences between traditional and radical criminology. However, we intend to show that there is significant overlap with respect to one of the more important concerns of criminology as traditionally defined: that concerning causation. Our presentation will suggest that certain empirical findings of traditional criminology can contribute to, or are consistent with, a radical explanation of criminality.

We focus on the causes of criminal behavior for three reasons. First, with the notable exception of Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1985), radical and conflict theorists have, to date, concerned themselves primarily with analyses of the origins of law, the distribution of official labeling, discrimination in sentencing, and the selective attention given to white-collar and corporate crimes. Not surprising, then, most empirical work in these areas focuses on the criminal justice system and related issues such as police shootings (Jacobs, 1979), enactment of delinquency legislation (Hagan and Leon, 1977), differential sentencing patterns (Lizotte, 1978), and patterns of corporate criminality (Michalowski, 1985; Reiman, 1984). Attention to these issues, and the companion tendency to neglect causation, is highlighted by Bernard (1981, p. 367), who states, with reference to conflict theory, that "the explanation of criminal behavior is not [conflict theory's] main purpose." As a consequence of this orientation, analysis of the initial causes of criminal involvement has been left to traditional theories (e.g., strain, cultural, or control models).

A second reason for concentrating on the causes of crime is that radical criminology emerged, in part, as a reaction to certain perceived ills of positivistic analyses. The first popularized attack on positivism was waged by Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973), and more recent critiques are found in Groves (1985) and Greenberg (1981, p. 2). However, there are signs that the relationship has mellowed with age, and over the past few years a number of empirical analyses have been undertaken in a Marxist vein (e.g., Hagan and Bernstein, 1979; Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Hagan and Leon, 1977; Lizotte, 1978; Lizotte, Mercy, and Wonkonen, 1982; Humphries and Wallace, 1980; Jacobs,

1979a, 1979b; Liska, Lawrence, and Benson, 1981; Greenberg, 1981; Groves and Corrado, 1983; Hagan and Parker, 1985; Hagan, Gillis, and Simpson, 1985). It would seem, then, that positivism has been used advantageously by radicals, and in a statement that reflects the position advocated in this article, Sparks (1980, p. 185) argues that the political agenda of radicals does not entail, "nor are they entailed, by the scientific views of contemporary Marxist criminologists." Of course any in-depth exploration of the relationship between Marxism and positivism would raise epistemological and methodological issues, both of which are beyond the scope of this article. However, without reducing Marxism to positivism, we agree with Greenberg (1981, p. 65) that "the concerns of positivist criminology and its empirical research findings are not inherently incompatible with a Marxian perspective" (for an excellent review of the relationship between Marxism and positivism, see Farr, 1984).

A third and final reason for emphasizing causation concerns the level of causal analysis preferred by traditional criminologists. By and large, research conducted within the traditional paradigm has been aimed at biological, psychological, and familial factors to the exclusion of structural context (see, e.g., Short's 1979 comments). Ironically, while the roots of early criminological thought were inextricably linked to structural and macrosociological variables (e.g., Shaw and McKay), empirical studies of delinquency in the 1970s and 1980s have been overly individualistic (e.g., Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). From a radical perspective this trend is disappointing, for it is axiomatic to radical theory that one cannot do justice to the study of crime without considering the structural context in which it is enmeshed (Lynch and Groves, 1985; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1985; Messerschmidt, 1986). For this reason it seems useful to examine whatever links traditional and radical criminology might have concerning the macrosociological sources of crime and delinquency.

In order to make clear the connections between traditional and radical criminology, we shall emphasize three criterion for comparing these "competing" paradigms. The first criterion is that social class plays an important role in the traditional theory in question. Criterion number two is that, consistent with the basic thrust of Marx's materialism, the theory employs a social-structural model of crime causation, which is itself cast in a consistent macrosociological context.¹ And a third and final criterion is that the theory offers a materialistic interpretation of the relationship between culture and social structure.

These three criteria are derived from conventional interpretations of Marxist theory, and our reasons for selecting these standards will be stated in subsequent discussion.

Though our primary purpose is to emphasize the contributions traditional theory might make to a radical explanation of crime, we readily acknowledge that radical theory can hardly be considered entirely consistent with the gamut of traditional thought. Thus we shall attempt to select and define issues as precisely as possible. As a general rule, the issues selected will range from those that (1) are fully compatible, or (2) are not compatible at present, but with certain emendations can provide fruitful possibilities for future theoretical and empirical research. In the course of our discussion we hope to demonstrate that "many insightful contributions [to radical analysis] have already been made by conventional criminology" (Colvin and Pauly, 1983, p. 523).

The traditional theories to be examined are cultural deviance, strain, and control theories, each of which has received considerable attention in the literature (Hirschi, 1969; Empey, 1982; Kornhauser, 1978). These theories are primarily concerned with lower-class criminality, and for this reason comparisons will be confined to common crimes or street crimes.² The theories will be examined in ascending order, from the last to the most compatible, beginning with theories in the cultural deviance tradition.

CULTURAL DEVIANCE THEORY

Of the three theories to be examined, cultural theory provides the poorest fit with radical expectations. True, social class (criterion 1) was an important explanatory variable for Sellin (1938), Miller (1958), Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967), and Banfield (1970). But class analysis is not necessarily Marxist analysis (Akers, 1980, p. 135), and the way social class has been employed in this tradition is virtually the opposite of the way it is used by radicals. With respect to criterion 2, there are virtually no references from which a structural explanation of crime might be inferred. And finally, cultural theorists make little attempt to interpret cultural values as a response to structural constraints (criterion 3). Let us review these objections, and then suggest an interpretation that would allow for a degree of compatibility between cultural deviance and radical theories.

We assume that the cultural position is well known, and offer only a skeletal summation of its central theoretical premise. That premise is that persons commit crimes because they have internalized procriminal values, a theme evident in Miller's (1979, p. 166) claim that a "dominant component of the motivation to 'delinquent' behavior engaged in by lower class corner groups involves a positive effort to achieve states, conditions, or qualities valued within the actors most significant cultural milieu." This same idea is given expression time and again in the works of cultural theorists, and Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967, p. 385) even argue that the "overt use of force or violence . . . is generally viewed as a reflection of basic values that stand apart from the dominant, central, or parent culture."

The specific values to which cultural theorists refer have been described in various ways, ranging from cultural emphases on toughness, trouble, and excitement (Miller, 1979), to subcultural preferences for immediate gratification and risk-taking (Banfield, 1970), to arguments that lower-class persons harbor impulsive, hedonistic, malicious, and negativistic value orientations (Cohen, 1955).³ Though minor differences exist in describing the specific contents of lower-class culture, the general conclusion to be drawn from the cultural deviance position is that persons engage in criminal behavior because it is demanded by their culture; persons commit crimes because they have learned that it is the "correct" thing to do (Sutherland, 1947).

But where do these "oppositional" or "inverted" (Cohen, 1955) values come from? This is an important question, and Miller (1979, p. 167) answers it by claiming that "lower class culture is a distinctive tradition many centuries old with an integrity all its own." Banfield (1970, p. 46) echoes this position when he argues that lower-class culture consists of "certain styles of life that are learned in childhood and passed on as a kind of collective heritage." Neither Banfield nor Miller provide evidence to support these assertions. It would seem that, for them, lower-class culture is something that floats through history and just happens to be adhered to by those at the bottom of the class hierarchy. But this forced and unsubstantiated account is offered a priori, and a more honest appraisal of the genesis of subcultural values is provided by Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967, p. 388), who frankly admit that they "are not prepared to assert how a subculture arises."

This brings us to a problem shared by all cultural theorists, a problem that sets them off from the type of analysis preferred by radicals (at least those grounding themselves in a Marxist approach): Their analysis is

idealistic in the extreme. It is informed by a belief that persons are motivated by ideas (values, beliefs) rather than by structurally defined constraints imposed by (in Marxist terminology) the material conditions of life. In the following passage, Cloward and Ohlin (1960, p. 75) offer a critique of the cultural theory claim that crime is caused by historically generated delinquent values. The passage is consistent with radical expectations, and paves the way for a materialist interpretation of the relationship between culture and social structure:

At some juncture the theorist must identify the social conditions from which these values develop as a solution to the adjustment problems of everyday life. The historical continuity theory of lower-class values as a source of delinquent norms . . . ignores the extent to which lower-class and delinquent cultures today are predictable responses to conditions in our society rather than persisting patterns taken over from foreign cultures.

To get a better idea of why cultural theory is idealistic, and how the structural emphasis implicit in Marx's materialism is capable of reformulating cultural theory in an acceptable way, let us review two claims central to a structural interpretation of Marx. The first is that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness" (Marx, 1975c, p. 41); and the second is that "what individuals are . . . coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce" (Marx and Engels, 1976, p. 42).

We are well aware that the materialism implied in this passage has its limitations.⁴ However, the general strategy is both crystal clear and totally at odds with cultural theory. In simple terms it states that the way people think and behave will be determined by their position in the class hierarchy, which Marx defined relative to one's relationship to the system of production. An "owner," for example, is likely to have certain values and to adopt a certain lifestyle that are best explained in terms of the structurally defined situation in which she or he exists, and vice versa for the "worker."

Carrying this model over to the study of crime, a materialist would attempt to explain crime, and/or the subcultural values that condone it, as responses to the actual life conditions that confront specified groups of people. But to do this is to reverse the causal strategy suggested by cultural theory. In contrast to a causal scheme that runs from ideas to behaviors, a structural or materialistic criminology begins with the

“material conditions of life” (Marx), these “conditions in our society” (Cloward and Ohlin), which taken together constitute the independent variable(s). “Ideas” are then interpreted in light of these material conditions, and, for this reason, values, ideas, and beliefs are demoted as causal candidates; they are now viewed as either dependent or intervening variables, and are defined as a response to specified material conditions and structural constraints. When discussing control theories we shall provide concrete examples of ways in which cultural values are derived from specific structural contexts, but for the moment let us point out something in favor of cultural theory: Unlike theories that assume “the existence of a common value system within the society or group whose norms are being violated” (Hirschi, 1969, p. 23), the cultural theorist does allow for some degree of variation in value orientations. This is consistent with the position taken by Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973, p. 101), who argue that

there is no good reason for assuming . . . that men born into different social positions and in widely different relationships to the structure of opportunity, will want or be able to internalize the dominant cultural goals.

And so, unlike consensus theorists, Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973, p. 185) postulate a “cultural diversity,” a “normative plurality” that

runs the whole gamut from total acceptance of societal morality . . . through to cases where deviants are in total opposition to conventional morality and are in large part motivated by their desire to destroy it.⁵

But it is one thing to acknowledge value pluralism, and quite another to provide a structural explanation for it. As is always the case, cultural theorists tend to minimize or ignore altogether the relevance of structural factors that might account for the existence of value variations and of the subcultures to which they devote so much attention.

In sum, cultural deviance theory departs from radical criminology in three ways. First, it defines social class subjectively rather than with reference to objective measures such as income, occupation, or how one relates to the system of production.⁶ Second, the idealistic inclinations of cultural theory are incompatible with a structural approach to crime causation. And third, cultural theory is “unable to link cultural features

to structural factors" (Takagi, 1982, p. 38). To bring cultural theory in line with radical expectations, the values and behaviors of individuals must be interpreted within a materialistic context, as responses to structurally defined constraints. This is the strategy adopted by Colvin and Pauly (1983, p. 514), who argue that "the relation of workplace control, which take various class related forms under capitalism, shape the consciousness and behavior of parents who repeatedly produce and reproduce control relationships with children," and it informs Kornhauser's (1978, p. 7) observation that "social interaction is . . . more immediately controlled by the principles of exchange and coercion that inhere in social structure than it is by the consensual values supplied by culture." Let us turn, then, to a model that attempts to escape the idealistic snare in which cultural theories are caught by providing a structural explanation of criminality.

STRAIN THEORY

In the classic essay *Social Structure and Anomie*, Merton (1979) states that his primary purpose is to discover how "some social structures exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conformist rather than conformist conduct." Insofar as a materialist or structuralist criterion is concerned, this passage makes for an immediate affinity between strain and radical theories. And with respect to the social class criterion, it is widely acknowledged that strain theory has definite class implications. The third criterion (i.e., which concerns a materialist interpretation of the culture/social structure relationship)⁷ is an issue best addressed in the control theory discussion that follows. Thus our goal in this section is to argue that strain theory is compatible with radical theory on two of the three dimensions specified earlier.

Materialism/Structuralism

In the preceding section we defined *materialism* as a Marxist strategy for explaining ideas and behaviors within specific situational and social structural contexts. We also suggested that situations and structural contexts constitute what Marx called the material conditions of life. When criminologists suggest that social structure has causal effects that are independent of culture, their arguments carry materialist overtones

that are consistent with generally accepted Marxist methodology (Kornhauser, 1978; Blau, 1977; Colvin and Pauly, 1983). Let us see how this structuralist strategy applies to the strain theory position on crime causation.

According to Merton (1979, p. 134), crime production comes in two parts, both of which are highlighted in the following passage: "Anti-social behavior is in a sense 'called forth' by certain conventional values *and* by the class structure involving differential access to approved opportunities." The first half of this passage suggests that "values" have something to do with crime causation, which, as noted in the previous section, seems inconsistent with a structural explanation of criminality. Kornhauser (1978, p. 146) has addressed this issue, and we shall return to it. For the moment let us isolate and examine the structural half of this passage.

It has been noted by several authors (Ellis, 1971; Etzioni, 1970; Kornhauser, 1978) that social control can be maintained in three ways: First, conformity is promoted when persons hold similar beliefs and values (the normative or cultural solution); second, conformity can be purchased by giving people access to socially approved incentives and rewards (the exchange solution); and third, conformity can be maintained by the use of force (the coercive solution). This last solution is undesirable, and is used primarily when other solutions fail. The normative solution is hard to come by in an age so frequently described as anomic, and the exchange solution was popularized by Durkheim (1964) in his *Division of Labor*. Summarizing a dense position, Durkheim argued that if society could promote a system of exchange perceived as equitable, if it could integrate mutual needs with functional interdependence, persons would develop "organic solidarity" even if they were no longer integrated "mechanically" by means of shared beliefs and values. A concise summation of Durkheim's position is provided by Kornhauser (1978, p. 45), who notes that "where culture is weak, the web of interdependency is sometimes dense."

But sometimes it is not, and the structural dimension of strain theory holds that the distribution of rewards does *not* encourage conformity, that rewards (in the strain theory case, those associated with upward mobility) are "relatively rare and difficult for those handicapped by little formal education and few economic resources" (Merton, 1979, p. 134). Cloward and Ohlin (1960, p. 119) embellish Merton's account when they note that crime is most likely to occur "in the social structure where rewards and opportunities are most scarce," and in a series of passages

that could have been written by a radical criminologist, Cloward and Ohlin (1960, p. 119) go on to suggest that (1) the social structure of "democratic society" (read: capitalism) is characterized by a limited and inequitably distributed supply of goods and services; (2) that those who fail to receive their fair share of these goods and services, who live under "adverse circumstances" (p. 39), are more prone to engage in delinquent behavior; and (3) that these reward structures and the delinquency that they inspire are not an attribute of individuals but are "a property of the social system in which these individuals are enmeshed" (p. 211). With these factors in mind, Cloward and Ohlin conclude that "the social setting . . . gives rise to delinquency" (p. 211), and so society gets the amount and type of crime that it deserves.

The short story here is a simple and familiar one: Inequality is structurally induced and it causes crime (see, also, Blau and Blau, 1982; Michalowski, 1985). However, neither Merton nor Cloward and Ohlin adhere to this position without qualification, and both agree that we should not expect "a linear correlation between crime and poverty" (Merton, 1979, p. 138, fn. 19; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, p. 105, fn. 35). By so qualifying the correlation between crime and poverty, strain theorists avoid charges of structural overdetermination. But this does not constitute a retreat from their general structural orientation. If the preceding discussion accurately summarizes the strain theory position, then both Merton and Cloward and Ohlin are in at least partial agreement with Blau's (1977, p. x) Marxist premise that "the structures of objective social positions among which people are distributed exert more fundamental influence on social life than do cultural values and norms."

But structure alone is not enough for Merton and Cloward and Ohlin. Culture too plays a role in their theory, and we now review, first, the strain theory position on culture, followed by, second, an assessment of Kornhauser's claim that this cultural component of the theory undermines its structural foundations.

Merton (1979, p. 135) highlights the cultural dimension of strain theory when he claims that "it is only when the full configuration is considered, poverty, limited opportunities [both structural factors] and a commonly shared system of success symbols that we can explain the higher association between poverty and crime in our society." These commonly shared success symbols constitute a cultural variable whose function is to provide "an aspirational frame of reference" to which everyone presumably aspires. When persons are unable to realize their

culturally induced aspirations due to blocked opportunities or "socially structured deprivations" (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, p. 103) they are, as Cloward and Ohlin put it, likely to experience acute or intense pressures, discontent, and frustration (p. 105), a sense of indignation and severe problems of adjustment (p. 108), a sense of alienation (p. 111), feelings of unjust deprivation (p. 113), and a sense of injustice that undermines the legitimacy of the social order (p. 118). Merton draws much of the same picture when he claims that a discrepancy or contradiction⁸ between culturally defined aspirations and structurally limited expectations gives rise to a state of unrelieved ambition, produces an "intolerable situation" of "frustration and thwarted aspiration" that combine to produce a "strain toward innovation" (pp. 134-135). Among the reactions to this strain are the following: exaggerated anxieties, hostilities, neuroses, antisocial behavior, fraud, corruption, vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscribed behaviors (pp. 132, 135).

In many respects this model accords quite well with a radical perspective. It all seems to be there: poverty, limited opportunity, a contradiction between what capitalism says it can deliver and what it does deliver, and the psychological correlates of frustration, deprivation, alienation, and injustice. In addition to these concerns, Merton argues that the "extreme emphasis on the accumulation of wealth as a symbol of success" gives rise to an instrumental attitude, blunts social sensitivity, and militates against the effectiveness of social controls, all of which retard the efficiency of lawful and "institutionally regulated modes of acquiring a fortune" (Merton, 1979, p. 132). Here is a society in which anything goes, in which the end justifies the means, in which an instrumental attitude prevails to such an extent that society becomes "tenuous and anomie ensues" (Merton, 1979, p. 131).⁹

So much of this rings true, and yet for all this, Kornhauser (1978, p. 146) argues that the strain theory emphasis on elevated aspirations is inconsistent with the Marxist or radical paradigm. The essence of her critique is that strain theory violates its own structural precepts because, of the two components of the theory (culture and social structure), it is *culture* that is responsible for elevated aspiration levels, strain, and hence the motivation to delinquency. Thus much like the cultural deviance model examined earlier, Kornhauser accuses strain theorists of explaining human motivation with reference to collectively shared *ideas* rather than the material conditions of life. On this reading, strain theory strays in the direction of cultural determinism and Parsonian oversocialization such that "the echoes of Marx's structural emphasis that

we detect in Merton's paradigm are almost drowned out by the stentorian tones of culture." In the end, Kornhauser (1978, p. 146) argues, "the promise of strain theory, to restore the importance of social structure, remains largely unredeemed."

In our view, Kornhauser's critique is overstated. To defend the structuralism implicit in strain theory, we shall argue for two interrelated theses: first, that strain theory is capable of accounting for the origin of pecuniary values by interpreting those values as culturally mandatory expressions of market relationships under capitalism. And, second, that by interpreting culture within this broader materialistic context, strain theory is also able to sidestep the criticism that the motivation to delinquency is located exclusively in the province of cultural norms and values. Let us take each issue in turn.

The cultural goal, which strain theorists see as providing an aspirational frame of reference, is pecuniary success, and their broader and well-taken point is that American culture has a strong commercial orientation. As such, culture encourages persons to pursue "the good life," which in our society is defined primarily in terms of material possessions (Michalowski, 1985, pp. 409-411). *The key to preserving the structuralist and materialist underpinnings of strain theory is to explain this commercial cultural orientation in Marxist terms by tracing pecuniary motivations to the economic requirements of capitalism.* This can be done by arguing that capitalism, if it is to function effectively, must produce and sell commodities, and that selling commodities on the required scale demands that considerable resources be spent on advertising so that consumers will be prepared for mass consumption (Ewen, 1977). In Marxist terms, Merton's consumer culture is part of capitalism's superstructure, and as such is a "reflex" of the economic requirements of capitalism. After all, it was Marx who claimed that "the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class," and there is nothing "un-Marxist" about referring to ideas as providing an aspirational frame of reference—provided those ideas are traced to the socio-economic incentive structures from which they arise.

Of course neither Merton nor Cloward and Ohlin explain the origins of culture in precisely these terms, but then they make no effort to explain the origin of consumer culture at all! Certainly nothing in their model precludes a Marxist interpretation. In addition, by placing consumer values within a broader materialistic context strain theory also avoids the idealism of cultural theorists, who explain crime with reference to values whose source is never convincingly specified.

Assuming that the strain theory notion of culture can be rescued by grounding it in a materialist interpretation, what of Kornhauser's related objection that strain theorists explain the motivation to delinquency with exclusive reference to collectively shared ideas rather than to structural context? Merton (1979, p. 134) himself belies this suggestion by arguing that crime is caused by conventional values "and by the class structure involving differential access to approved opportunities." Bernard (1984, p. 367) affirms Merton's structural emphasis when he concludes that the "major strain theories are primarily structural theories, with the cultural elements reduced or eliminated." Thus one way to deal with Kornhauser's objection is to argue that it is one-sided and at least partially inaccurate.

But an equally important qualification enters when we scrutinize the convenient analytical separation of culture and social structure. If the foregoing account means anything, it means that culture stands in a dialectical relationship to social structure such that culture and social structure are not two unrelated or "different" things. Thus to say that persons are motivated by pecuniary cultural values is not the Parsonian sin Kornhauser believes it to be, and because these values are part of the cultural/structural matrix of capitalism, they cannot be dismissed as irrelevant factors in the production of crime. As one radical criminologist (Michalowski, 1985, p. 409) points out, pecuniary values are part and parcel of capitalist ideology, and "these orientations significantly increase the likelihood of crimes by both the powerful and the powerless."

Social Class

Social class is another important component of strain theory. It enters with the recognition that discrepancies between aspirations and expectations widen as one descends in the class structure, and that consequently "the pressure to engage in deviant behavior will be greatest in the lower levels of society" (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960, p. 86).¹⁰ Having defended the structural emphasis of strain theory, what emendations can be offered that will bring the strain theory concept of social class in line with radical expectations?

Once again we confront an issue on which strain theorists are silent, for, as Colvin and Pauly (1983, p. 517) point out, neither Merton nor Cloward and Ohlin specify the structural sources of either social differentiation or the differential opportunity structures so important to

their theory. In fairness to strain theorists, their's is an attempt to explain crime, not the origin of social class. But if a case is to be made that strain theory is compatible with radical theory, we must go beyond the simple descriptive account of social class provided by Cloward and Ohlin and Merton. To do this the genesis of differential opportunity and class structures must be situated within an appropriate Marxist framework: specifically, as by-products of the capital-labor relationship, which is defined by the way one relates to the system of production.

We are not suggesting that had strain theorists addressed this issue, they would explain the origin of social class in Marxist terms. It is more likely that they would invoke an explanation drawing on Weber or Parsons. However, because strain theorists fail to specify a theoretical tradition that speaks to this issue, the interpretation is up for grabs. And because it is up for grabs, there is nothing to prevent radicals from explaining social class in Marxist terms. Thus by tracing the origin of differential opportunity structures to a Marxist socioeconomic context, radicals can amend the strain theory position in a manner consistent with their own theoretical expectations and, by so doing, fill in what has until now been a "silent spot" in the strain theory position.

Let us summarize our position thus far.

Cultural theories are important for their appreciation of cultural diversity. To be sure, their emphasis on cultural pluralism is taken too far, and their notion that values compel behavior is idealistic in the extreme. However, this is not to say that attention to values is unimportant—far from it. It is to say that the way in which cultural theorists have handled the value question leaves much room for improvement.

In terms of radical/traditional compatibility, strain theory constitutes a significant improvement over theories of cultural deviance. First, by employing a notion of social structure, and by focusing on the etiological significance of structured inequalities and existential conditions, strain theory offers an explanation consistent with the materialist underpinnings of Marxist theory. And, second, by explaining the origin of differential opportunity structures (i.e., class structures) in Marxist terms, strain theory is qualified in a way that makes it compatible with the Marxist heritage of radical criminology. For these and other reasons, several theorists have argued that rejections of strain theory (e.g., Hirschi, 1969; Kornhauser, 1978) are premature, and have called for increased attention to strain-oriented research (Bernard, 1984).

CONTROL AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY

In their *Adolescent Subcultures and Delinquency*, Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1985, p. xi) suggest that both control theories and theories of social disorganization have contributed to the theoretical crisis in criminology. They explicitly reject both control and social disorganization theories as adequate explanations of crime.¹¹ For reasons that will become clear in a moment, we agree that neither control nor social disorganization theory currently constitutes a "complete" explanation of crime. However, macrosociological versions of control and social disorganization theories do an excellent job of explaining lower-class criminality, and with certain theoretical adjustments these theories can be made fully compatible with radical expectations. Thus of the three traditional models considered in this article, we believe that control and social disorganization theories provide an even better fit with radical expectations than does strain theory. We now attempt to substantiate that position.

In his seminal statement on control theory, Hirschi (1969, p. 16) argued that "delinquent acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or broken," and in her elaboration and defense of control theory Kornhauser (1978, p. 45) reaffirms this theoretical position, arguing that "the strength of social bonds is the foundation of social control; its variation accounts for delinquency."

But what constitutes a "bond?" What is required to establish this bond? And how are secure social bonds maintained? To answer these questions control theorists have in recent years relied on macrosociological and structural orientations, and have also reaffirmed common-sense expectations concerning the relationship between social class and crime.¹² What follows is a condensed version of control theory's theoretical position, followed by a review of its structural and social class orientations. This completed, we shall compare control and radical theories on the relationship between culture and social structure.

In abstract theoretical terms, control theorists argue that strong social bonds will form when there are adequate social controls, defined by Kornhauser (1978, p. 24) as "actual or potential rewards and punishments that accrue from conformity to or deviation from norms." On the positive side, this means that conformity must be purchased, must have some reward value for the individual. Rewards, however, are

not always plentiful, and when rewards are scarce persons can be made to conform by threatening them with punishment. The logic of the theory also suggests that there is an inverse relationship between rewards and punishments in terms of effectiveness, that is, as rewards decrease, greater and greater recourse to coercive measures is required to ensure conformity.

Hirschi (1969, p. 20) calls this Benthamite element of the theory the "rational component in conformity," which begins with the very reasonable assumption that persons are likely to conform when they stand to gain by doing so. But there is a criminogenic side to this coin, for when conformity is no longer perceived as rewarding there are (1) decreased "stakes in conformity," (2) an increase in the likelihood that persons will strike out on their own, and (3) an enhanced probability that such persons will engage in delinquent or criminal behavior. Reduced to its simplest terms, control theory suggests that when society fails to reward its members it will be ineffective as a source of social control, or, in the neutral language of control theory, that "the differential vulnerability to delinquency is determined by variation in the strength of social bonds, the sum of which account for the net costs of delinquency" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 24).

The key to bridging radical and control theories concerns the variables that control theorists specify as accounting for the strengthening (or weakening) of social bonds, and evidence that there is an affinity between these theories can be inferred from a series of control theory claims. For example, control theories that operate at a macro-sociological level suggest that weak controls stem from the alienation of both individuals and groups from meaningful contact with social institutions, and that this alienation is conditioned by poverty, inequality, and a number of other factors (e.g., heterogeneity, mobility, family disruption) that disrupt social relationships in specified ecological areas (Sampson, 1985, 1986). While this in itself is certainly compatible with radical criminology, we shall have to expand the explanatory scope of control theory in order to bring it fully in line with radical expectations, and shall do so by interpreting its ecological emphasis within a wider political and economic context.

We now review some of the concrete contributions of control theory. Though we shall refer to a number of theorists (e.g., Suttles, Shaw & McKay, Hirschi, Nye, Rainwater, Liebow), the discussion relies primarily on Kornhauser's (1978) *Social Sources of Delinquency*, which is

the most complete and sophisticated rendering of macrosocial control theory available.

A moment ago we reviewed the control theory claim that persons are most likely to conform when they perceive conformity as rewarding, when they stand to benefit from conformity in some way. Putting this same theme in slightly different terms, Kornhauser argues that persons are receptive to socialization efforts when those efforts relate to the gratification of human needs and wants (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 39). Viewed from this perspective, need gratification is a precondition for the establishment of both strong social bonds and strong social controls.

But what happens when "the means by which wants are gratified are unequally distributed" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 39)? It is here that both social class and inequality enter the control theory discussion for, as Kornhauser goes on to argue, in a class society "the gratification-deprivation balance cannot be the same for everyone" (p. 48). Sticking strictly to control theory logic, the suggestion is that some locations in the class structure are more rewarding than others, that such positions are more likely to be effective in promoting conformity than less rewarding positions, and consequently, that "not all milieus are equally effective units of social control" (p. 47). This argument suggests that bonding varies by class position and "is not in fact the same for everyone" (p. 47), and, in a passage that could have come from Marx, Kornhauser (p. 46) describes the effects inequality has on social cohesion by noting that "the web of interdependency is weak where unequal exchanges prevail." This, we shall argue, is the crux of the structuralist and materialist orientation of control theory.

Materialism/Structuralism

Time and again Kornhauser emphasizes the importance of social structure and situation as loci for social control. But what exactly does she mean by social structure? Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973, p. 259) had criticized Quinney for avoiding "a detailed examination of . . . social structure," and were we to stick with the control model as formulated thus far, the most we could say is that inequality affects one's cost-benefit calculations, making those with fewer resources more susceptible to crime. There is reason to believe that this is true, but it is something of a platitude.

In *Character and Social Structure*, Gerth and Mills (1964, pp. 23-26) define social structure as a combination of institutions and institutional

orders, and among the component parts of social structure they include economic, political, military, kinship, educational and religious institutions, and institutional orders. Durkheim, to whom control theory owes a significant debt, argued that a balanced social structure will be characterized by a high degree of integration among and between these various institutions. This, in fact, is the central concern of a structurally oriented control theory, the goal of which is to specify the nature, source, and strength of the links between various institutional positions (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 146).

With this we come to the heart of control theory for, as community control theorists and social disorganization theorists (Shaw and McKay, 1942) are quick to point out, many institutions in American communities do not have coherent linkages either within the community itself or with political and economic institutions "outside" the ecological area in question. Roland Warren, an acknowledged authority on community structures, describes these shortcomings in control theory terms when he suggests that communities lacking coherent ties are deficient in both horizontal and vertical bonding.¹³ Specifically, Warren (1978, p. 240) argues that communities have

two distinct types of systematic ties: the relationships through which they are oriented to the larger society beyond the community constitute the community's vertical pattern, and those that local units share with each other on the local level constitute the society's horizontal pattern.

Axiomatic to control theory is that problems arise when such ties are weak or absent. For his part, Durkheim listed anomie as the social-psychological consequence of breakdowns in interinstitutional bonding, and Kornhauser (1978, p. 57) flatly states that ecological and institutional disruptions such as these promote crime, or, in her words, that "community disorganization causes delinquency." That much of this disorganization stems from structurally generated deprivations that weaken institutional controls is evident in a series of observations that suggest that, as a consequence of poverty, "the intermediate structures created in communities that are more affluent and knowledgeable fail to emerge in the less resourceful slum" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 79). Kornhauser goes on to note that institutions in ecologically deprived areas are unstable and isolated and that, due directly to the absence of linking structures and functions,

there is a paucity of intermediate relations that link primary to secondary institutions [vertical links] and secondary institutions to each other [horizontal links]. Without intermediate structures, communitywide relations are weak or cannot become established. The family in particular has few links to other institutions. . . . The school stands apart from the remainder of the community.

Thus unlike control theorists who emphasize the importance of proximate social bonds such as those supplied by familial and educational structures (Nye, 1958; Hirschi, 1969), control theorists who operate at the level of community controls adopt a consistent macrosociological and structural approach that assumes "that many controls are to some degree affected by or inhere in macro-social contexts" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 106). This macrosocial focus is consistent with the contextual orientation of Marxist theory (Lynch and Groves, 1985, pp. 14-16), and it also makes clear that the defect is unambiguously structural, which brings us back to a theme discussed earlier: that ecological areas characterized by poverty¹⁴ and the short-end of a lopsided distribution pattern are less able to make provision for basic human needs, virtually assuring that it will not be perceived as rewarding by some portion of its population. Society is to blame because its institutions "fail to fulfill the needs of impoverished slum residents" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 80). Its institutions cannot give people what they need, cannot adequately reward appropriate conduct, and "fail in all types of control" as a result (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 81).

All told, then, community control theorists suggest that lower-class areas are afflicted with structurally generated poverty and inequality; institutions in these areas are defective in that vertical and horizontal ties are weak or absent; because institutions are ineffective, they hinder the development of meaningful social bonds; when persons are not bonded to (or are alienated from) social institutions, strong social controls are by definition absent; and finally, because weak controls precede delinquency, the cause of delinquency lies in macrosocial ecological contexts characterized by structurally defective institutions and weak social controls.

From a radical perspective, the contextual emphasis of community control theory is most welcome. By expanding the empirical referent of the theory, microvariables such as family and education can be interpreted within more meaningful ecological contexts, thus qualifying

their status as "independent" variables (see, e.g., Colvin and Pauly, 1983). But what of the ecological context itself? Ecologies do not "just happen," and it may appear to certain Marxists that the emphasis on community characteristics is limited because it ignores the wider realm of political economy.

This is an important issue, and for assistance we again turn to Warren (1978, pp. 423-424), whose most recent effort in community theory replaces a "closed systems" approach with a model situating communities within the context of "larger national and even international social orders." In this view, communities are defined as local enactments of national and international policy, and the theoretical implication is that "anyone interested in the economic viability of local communities must turn to the economics of the macro-system" (p. 425). Much as we are attempting to argue with reference to the relationship between traditional and radical criminology, Warren also makes clear that the impetus for expanding theoretical efforts in community theory derives from Marx, or, as he puts it, that "the major thrust of interest in relating local phenomena to national systems comes from neo-Marxist 'critical sociology'" (Warren, 1978, p. 427).

By expanding the theoretical scope of community control theory in a way that allows for a merger with radical theory, we also address what Short (1985, pp. 51-72) calls "the level of explanation problem in criminology." Radicals, of course, have been most comfortable with a broad level of explanation, which has occasionally led to vacuous and somewhat frenzied claims concerning the criminogenic effects of capitalism. Traditional criminologists, on the other hand, are often unable to grasp the "Big Picture." For our part, we agree with Short (1985, p. 68) that "each level of explanation is important and, without attention to each level, complete explanation and understanding are impossible."⁵ If for no other reason than this, future efforts should take seriously whatever links might exist between traditional and radical criminology.

Thus far we have emphasized the structural orientation of control theory, and have cited a few of the many passages highlighting the importance of social class. But we have yet to examine what goes on in the heads of persons who engage in criminal behavior, which is consistent with Kornhauser's (1978, p. 117) very Marxist observation that "social structure takes its toll whether or not its effects are registered in people's minds." But control theorists do not ignore the phenomenological or psychological dimension of criminal motivation. Let us see

how they handle this issue, paying special attention to the relationship between culture and social structure.

*A Materialist Interpretation
of the Relationship Between
Culture and Social Structure*

In our earlier discussion of a materialist approach to the culture/-social structure issue we noted that the goal from a Marxist perspective is "to link cultural features to structural factors" (Takagi, 1982, p. 38), the specific strategy being to trace ideas and values to the material conditions of day-to-day life. Viewed from this perspective, we also argued that two central assumptions made by cultural deviance theorists were unacceptable to radicals: first, that lower-class beliefs have their source in an ill-defined historical continuity in values, and second, that persons commit crimes because these behaviors are "valued within the actor's most significant cultural milieu" (Miller, 1979, p. 166). Note, however, that radical theory is not committed to the position that "focal concerns" (e.g., fate, toughness, the desire for immediate gratification) do not exist in lower-class areas; what it *is* committed to is a rejection of any position that claims to explain these values without reference to the material conditions of life, that is, with little or no attention to things such as structurally generated deprivation, poverty, and inequality.

Because control theory explains the culture/social structure relationship in precisely these terms, it provides an excellent compliment to radical theory. We should add that materialist insights are not confined to control theorists, for a number of authors (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1971; Rainwater, 1970; Curtis, 1975; Kornhauser, 1978) suggest that many "cultural" responses are not really preferred and valued responses at all; on the contrary, they are "adaptations to situational exigencies rather than embodiments of cultural values" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 6). Let us take as examples the alleged cultural preferences for fate and immediate gratification (Miller, 1979; Banfield, 1970).

In her attempt to explain the cultural preference for "fate," Kornhauser (1978, p. 210) offers the following criticism of Miller: "Miller should have tried to determine what there is in the existential conditions of lower class life that result in apathy and fatalism, but these traits are gratuitously attributed to lower class culture." And why should a lower-class person be less likely to defer gratification? Simply because many

have very little to defer for. As Liebow (1967, pp. 65-66) puts it, the lower-class person finds himself "living on the edge," and if he

squanders a week's pay in two days it is not because, like an animal or a child, he is "present-time oriented," unaware or unconcerned with his future. He does so precisely because he is aware of the future and the hopelessness of it all.

Given that unemployment, underemployment, secondary labor market jobs, and marginal social status are the probable end states reserved for lower-class persons, particularly for blacks, it is little wonder that values and goals to which persons would aspire if given the opportunity are perceived (correctly in most cases) as being out of reach. One need not be a liberal or a Marxist to see that lower-class persons enjoy fewer life chances than those available to more privileged members of society, and persons who do not entertain realistic expectations for advancement (e.g., in the business world, in politics, in education, and so on) are not likely to hold out for what are in fact nonrealizable goals. As Rainwater (1970, pp. 299-300) puts it, "the choice is not necessarily seen as one between immediate and deferred gratification, but probably between immediate gratification and none at all."

The point, from both a radical and control theory perspective, is that one need not invoke culture to explain these behaviors, that social structure alone can account for similar behavioral orientations. As Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973, p. 112) have argued, persons living in similar areas and exposed to similar conditions are liable to display similar behavior patterns. Kornhauser (1978, p. 203) echoes this point as follows: "People who occupy similar positions may behave in similar ways without sharing a sub-culture."

The contrast between the control/radical perspective and that assumed by cultural deviance theory could not be clearer. Where cultural theorists assume that lower-class culture is a function of historical continuity in values, the control/radical perspective assumes that these "values" are re-created as persons time and again experience the failure and alienation associated with structurally generated poverty and inequality. As Liebow (1967, p. 223) puts it, the son of the lower-class person "goes out and independently experiences the same failures, in the same areas, and for the same reasons as his father." The point, once again, is that "ideas" are not as powerful a motivator as some

would have us believe, and that "social structure by itself is capable of accounting for similar orientations" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 230).¹

This control theory account also squares with that offered by radicals for its rejection of the extreme relativism implied in cultural explanations (Platt, 1982; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1977; Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973, p. 145). From a radical perspective, persons commit crimes because something is wrong, and crime is itself an indication that social structures are arranged such that persons are unable to realize their human potential, to become "species-beings," as Marx put it. If crime were *truly* valued it could hardly be taken as an indication of alienated social relationships, and the critical import of the radical tradition would be seriously undermined.

Here is an area where radical criminology stands to benefit from the critical implications of traditional criminological research, which suggests that many persons engage in behaviors that they do not approve of, and are in a social-psychological sense victimized by their own criminality. For instance, a number of studies (Short and Strodbeck, 1965; Buffalo and Rodgers, 1971; Ball, 1966; Conklin, 1971) suggest that the vast majority of persons agree in the direction of their attitudes toward legal norms, and with such studies in mind Akers (1980, p. 136) shakes a finger at the relativistic implications of conflict theory, noting that "the existence of such widespread evidence of consensus is not a trivial finding." For the sake of expediency, persons may break rules and may even attribute a kind of pseudo or counterfeit legitimacy to criminal or delinquent behavior. As Cloward and Ohlin (1960, p. 41) put it, "People may attribute legitimacy to rules that are in conflict with social norms—even when they regard the official norms as morally superior."

Thus unlike the cultural theorist, who argues that certain groups promote and condone criminal behavior, the control/radical perspective assumes that crime is undesirable, not just to you and I, but to the vast majority of persons who engage in it. To coin a Marxist phrase, this perspective suggests that there may be a "contradiction" between what people say and what they do, or, in control theory terms, that persons often violate rules in which they believe (Hirschi, 1969, p. 23). The question is *Why?* And the answer is that *structural* factors (see fn. 1) cause people to behave in ways that put them at odds not only with society, but with themselves as well.

But to say that persons do not value criminal behavior is not to say

that all persons everywhere disapprove of crime with the same level of intensity, nor is it to say that societal values are of equal salience for criminals and noncriminals alike. We have argued that *some* notion of value variability was worth preserving from the cultural tradition, and criminals and noncriminals alike may exhibit some degree of ambivalence toward "dominant" values. Thus while it is true that certain delinquents may be "less disapproving of some delinquent acts than non-delinquents" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 221), it is also true that these same delinquents have a need to rationalize their criminal behavior and are ambivalent about their delinquency (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Crime may be less fervently condemned, but that is because it is a fact of life for persons in urban slums, and "what is inevitable cannot be deplored with as much conviction as what is avoidable" (Kornhauser, 1978, p. 225).

To preserve the critical import of control theory it is important to add that less-than-fervent condemnation is not approval, and for this reason control theorists argue that what values do surround delinquency are not "genuine" values. On the contrary, "values" such as these reflect "forced or adaptive behaviors rather than real values with a positive determining influence on behavior of choice" (Liebow, 1967, p. 213, fn. 3). Liebow refers to these systems of self-justification as a "shadow system of values" whose function is to rationalize structurally induced failures. Picking up on this theme, Kornhauser (1978, pp. 133, 120) argues that persons who have been structurally marginalized are unable to "come anywhere close to realizing societal values," and, as a consequence, societal values become attenuated because they "lack relevance to the self or to a specified collectivity."

Psychologically speaking, this is the meaning of social disorganization, which, for Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973, p. 133), refers to "the disjunction between culture and structure." Kornhauser (1978, p. 120) makes exactly the same claim, arguing that "social disorganization means the lack of articulation of social structure with common values." In a word, control theory argues that cultural distortions flow from and are caused by structural disorganization, and, with this, control theory holds to a position on the culture/social structure issue that is perfectly consistent with the materialist orientation preferred by Marxist and radical criminologists.¹⁶

With this we have reviewed as many points of contact between traditional and radical theory as space will allow. We hope to have established, especially with reference to strain and control theories,

some measure of continuity with respect to (1) social class, (2) a structuralist or materialist methodological orientation, and (3) the culture/social structure issue. We also hope that a persuasive case has been made that traditional criminology can contribute to a theoretical deepening of the radical position, and vice versa.

CONCLUSION

Ideological classifications of delinquency theories are a poor guide to understanding them [Kornhauser, 1978, p. 40].

Since the emergence of radical criminology as a semiunified tradition in the early 1960s, the field has been fractured, with radicals on the left, traditionalists on the right. The most significant differences have concerned ideological commitments (e.g., on the role of the state and law, the role of the criminologist with respect to social change, and so on), and it goes without saying that ideological learnings often shape specific research agendas. "Ideology," as Miller (1973, p. 142) once noted, "is the permanent hidden agenda of criminal justice."

It is probably safe to assume that ideological differences are here to stay. However, we believe there are grounds for at least a partial cease-fire with respect to empirical questions concerning causation. Positivism, as Hagan (1985, p. 82) and Sparks (1980, p. 185) point out, is indifferent to ideological claims, and an increasing number of radical criminologists are utilizing empirical techniques to support their arguments. If positivism is indeed capable of describing causal connections in a neutral, nonpartisan manner, then we would expect sound empirical findings uncovered by radicals to be verified by equally sound findings in traditional criminology.

As this article suggests, there is already a fair amount of convergence between the two traditions with respect to certain causal variables, and we would hope that future efforts tone down the "us-and-them" approach in favor of a strategy that borrows the best that each tradition has to offer. While ideological differences will continue to distinguish traditional from radical criminology, empirical work should be undertaken with a self-conscious mandate to minimize the influence of partisan ideological positions. This request applies with equal force to both traditional and radical criminology.

NOTES

1. We have stated the requirements of a social-structural approach to crime causation elsewhere (Groves and Sampson, 1986; Sampson, 1986). Summarizing our position, a structural approach to crime causation suggests that characteristics of macrosocial units have independent effects on crime that are not attributable to the properties of individuals. The goal of this approach is to isolate structural characteristics of collectivities (communities, societies) that lead to high rates of criminality, and the specific strategy is to identify those factors that either (a) provide positive incentives and motivations for criminality or (b) reduce the incentives and motivations for conformity. In this interpretation, motivations and stakes in conformity can be structurally induced, rather than simply a property of an individual's psychological make-up.

2. The traditional focus on lower-class crime has been justly criticized by radicals as ignoring crime in the middle and upper classes (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1985, p. xi; Michalowski, 1985; Lynch and Groves, 1985). In spite of this acknowledged defect in traditional theory, we shall argue that the explanation of lower-class crime provided by certain traditional theorists is both consistent with Marxist expectations, and can embellish radical explanations of lower-class crime. Of course any adequate account of criminal etiology will have to explain the occurrence of criminal behavior in all social classes.

3. We realize that Cohen is often characterized as a strain theorist. However, his attribution of values mentioned in the text to delinquent boys is consistent with a cultural-type explanation, and for this reason his is best described as a mixed model (Kornhauser, 1978).

4. Marx's materialism has drawn fire for being overly deterministic and for reducing consciousness to mere epi-phenomenon (see Avineri, 1971; Bernstein, 1974; Harrington, 1976; Plamanatz, 1975; Vasquez, 1977). While there is much to be said for these qualifications, there is also much to be said in defense of Marx's claim that social structure conditions consciousness in predictable ways. This is what Marx meant in the passage cited in the text; it is at the heart of both Marxist materialism and of the structural orientation to crime causation advocated in this article.

5. Shaw and McKay (1942, p. 165) made this same claim some 40 years ago. As they put it, "moral values range from those that are strictly conventional to those that are in direct opposition to conventionality." While it is certainly true that some criminals harbor values that are in "direct opposition" to conventional morality, this does not seem to be the case with most criminals. In fact, it is reserved for very few criminals, and they generally have a highly activated political consciousness (e.g., George Jackson). But even these individuals, who refer to the "outside enemy culture" (Jackson, 1970, p. 17), do not argue that crime and violence are "good" things. They may be necessary in a time of class struggle, but are not valued in and for themselves. We shall return to this issue when discussing control theories in section three.

6. Banfield (1970, pp. 125-126) exemplifies the tendency to define class subjectively when he singles out one cultural value as the cause of poverty and argues that "extreme present orientedness, not lack of income or wealth is the principle cause of poverty," an assumption that allows him to conclude that "a person who is poor . . . is upper class if she or he is psychologically capable of providing for a distant future" (Banfield, 1970, p. 48). Obviously, this position depends on a very unusual and thoroughly subjective definition of social class. Kornhauser (1978, p. 11) takes issue with Banfield's claim and, adopting a

position consistent with Marxism, argues that "the explanation of both poverty and the behavior associated with it must lie . . . in social structure and situation."

7. Though control theory does a better job, certain claims made by Merton suggest that strain theory can contribute to a materialist interpretation of the culture/social structure relationship. A complete defense of this claim is beyond the scope of this article, but a brief summation looks like this: Merton defines his typology of adaptations as responses to sociocultural situations in which goals and means are not in balance. Merton does not correlate specific adaptations with class position, but it is not unreasonable to assume that his adaptations have class-specific referents (e.g., ritualism being most likely to occur in the lower-middle or middle class, retreatism in the lower class, and so on). Furthermore, if each adaptation brings with it a distinctive value orientation (e.g., the rebel will have values that differ from the ritualist), then Merton's typology would allow us to correlate specific adaptations (and the values they entail) with specific locations in the class structure. This interpretation would also qualify the claim that strain theorists assume consensus on values, for Merton (1979, pp. 133-134) flatly states that adaptations "will be determined by the particular personality, and thus by the *particular* cultural background involved."

8. "Contradiction," of course, is a Marxist term, and Merton's concept of strain is quite consistent with Marx's notion of contradiction. For example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960, p. 82) argue that "one of the paradoxes of social life is that the processes by which societies seek to ensure order sometimes results in disorder. If a cultural emphasis on unlimited success goals tends to solve some problems in industrial society, it also creates new ones." Cloward and Ohlin are pointing out one way in which capitalism tends to undermine or "contradict" itself, a skill at which Marx was particularly adept.

9. This view is hardly peculiar to strain theory. The notion that capitalistic society promotes an egoistic orientation was at the heart of Bongers's (1916) criminology, and was taken for granted by Marx (1975a, p. 231), who once argued that "egoism must be punished as a crime." The haunting theme of industrial capitalism encouraging instrumental rationality is a mainstay of so much of Weber's (1977) work, and finds contemporary expression in Ellul (1964), Foucault (1979), and a number of efforts by members of the Frankfurt School (Marcuse, 1969; Horkheimer, 1974a, 1974b; Habermas, 1970, 1971). The subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which capitalism fuels demand by maintaining artificially high levels of aspiration has been examined by Packard (1970), and Ewen (1976). The notion that perceived injustice can induce a "legitimation crisis" is central to Habermas (1975) and Friedrichs (1980), and Merton's discussion of the way in which unrestrained competitive secularization leads to a breakdown of the regulatory structure, to chaos and anomie, is a time-worn sociological theme stretching through Marx (1975b), Durkheim (1966), Nisbet (1978), and a host of others.

10. In her own review of the strain theory, Kornhauser (1978, p. 147) reaffirms the theory's commitment to social class by observing that "the lower classes . . . are most subject to strain."

11. The Schwendinger's rejection of social disorganization theory rests in part on a caricatured version of that theory. They suggest, for example, that social disorganization attributes criminality to "the destruction of the traditional family, uncontrolled individual behavior, and disorganized personality characteristics" (1985, p. 27). This may have been typical of earlier versions of social disorganization theory, but it bears scant resemblance to more sophisticated contemporary versions of that theory. Our own interpretation of

social disorganization theory is drawn from Kornhauser (1978), who is at pains to emphasize the *social* sources of delinquency (the major title of her book). Though the Schwendingers cite Kornhauser (once in 304 pages), it is apparent that they have either not read her book or have not taken it seriously. This is both unfortunate and ironic. It is unfortunate because Kornhauser and the Schwendingers have much in common (e.g., both emphasize ways in which structural conditions undermine the ability of individuals and groups "to determine their lives in the face of adversity" [Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1985, p. 28]). It is ironic because, much like the neglected *Adolescent and Delinquent Subcultures*, Kornhauser's *Social Sources of Delinquency* deserves far more attention than it has received.

12. Speaking to the social class issue, Kornhauser (1978, p. 104) refers to the somewhat surprising findings of earlier control theorists who found no relationship between social class (SES) and crime as follows:

Many control theorists (e.g., Nye and Hirschi), forewarned by their data, do not posit a relation between SES and delinquency. But the logic of control theory and the evidence of known empirical relationships warrant a prediction of such an association.

Kornhauser reaches this conclusion after reviewing limitations of self-report techniques that make it highly unlikely that class relationships will be uncovered. Following her critique, she concludes that "considered in the aggregate, the results of all studies together suggest that there is a valid, nonnegligible relation between SES and extreme delinquency in large, heterogeneous communities" (Kornhauser, 1978, pp. 82-99; see, also, Sampson and Castellano, 1982).

13. Shaw and McKay (1942, p. 164) were also sensitive to the need for intermediate relations that would promote horizontal and vertical ties, and argued that such linkages were more likely to appear in the middle or upper class.

In the middle-class areas and areas of high economic status, . . . social control is expressed in institutions and voluntary associations. . . . Among these may be included such organizations as the parents-teacher's associations, women's clubs, service clubs, churches, neighborhood centers, and the like.

Social class also enters into Kornhauser's (1978, p. 81) observation that "the child in a more affluent setting finds in all institutions well smoothed paths to valued goals."

14. Poverty is of course a mainstay correlate of crime for radical theorists. To cite a single example, Quinney (1977, p. 32) argues that "any study of crime involves an investigation of such natural products and contradictions of capitalism as poverty, inequality, unemployment, and the economic crisis of the capitalist state." Poverty was defined as the single most important cause of social disorganization by Shaw and McKay (1942, p. 183), and after painstaking literature review, Kornhauser (1978, p. 138) concludes that Shaw and McKay's results remain unchallenged, that "economic status was the most important correlate of neighborhood rates," and, finally, that the "correlation between community economic level and delinquency rates is high and secure" (p. 100).

Thus the control theory emphasis on poverty allows for an obvious point of contact with radical theory.

15. This request, that criminologists pay attention to macro and micro linkages, can hardly be considered new. In *The Sociological Imagination* Mills (1979) asked that we make self-conscious linkages between public issues and private troubles, and in *The New Criminology*, Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973) outlined a program for integrating the wider and immediate origins of the criminal act. There have, however, been some theoretical and empirical refinements on this position. See, for example, Lynch and Groves, 1986, pp. 14-15; and Coleman, 1986, pp. 1320-1326.

16. This unidirectional causal account of the relationship between social structure and culture (i.e., where structure sets the contours of culture) requires qualification. No doubt culturally defined interpretations "act back on" and reinforce structural arrangements, making the relationship between culture and social structure more dialectical than our account suggests. We would argue, however, that this dialectic is not equally weighted. With Marx, we adopt as a rule of thumb his assumption that existence determines consciousness, and it is this assumption that animates our view of the relationship between culture and social structure as outlined in this article.

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