
Attitudes toward the Black Political Movement: Trends, Meaning, and Effects on Racial Policy Preferences*

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This paper examines the influence of prejudice and of conflict-based concern with protecting group position on people's attitudes toward the black political movement. Analyses of national survey data show the existence of black-white differences in trends in attitudes toward the black political movement; in part, these trends reflect differential strategic adaptation to changes in the political context. For many whites, attitudes toward the black political movement are related to other conflict attitudes (perceptions of conflicting group objectives and fraternal deprivation) and to general social protest orientations net of the effects of measures of prejudice. Attitudes toward the black political movement also influence racial policy preferences. Each of the conflict attitudes, however, is related strongly to measures of prejudice. Implications of the results of the group conflict and prejudice approaches to racial attitudes are discussed.

The political activism and demands of black Americans are a major force in changing black-white relations in the United States. Yet there has been only limited concern with the changing character and determinants of public opinion regarding the civil rights movement, black militancy, and other forms of black political activism. My general hypothesis is that reactions to the black political movement involve both racial prejudice and real political conflict between whites and blacks as members of social groups that are respectively the target public and the constituency public of that movement.

This paper develops and then tests ideas that differentiate (where possible) prejudice-based and realistic conflict-based sources of attitudes toward the black political movement. The theoretical argument emphasizes a group conflict perspective on racial attitudes because ideas about these types of factors are

less well developed in the literature. From this viewpoint, groups occupying different positions in a system of racial stratification will differ sharply in their attitudes toward social movements that originate within the minority community. To the minority group, such a movement represents a voice for desired goals and should elicit positive evaluation. For the majority group, the movement represents an unwanted threat to an accepted social order and to a privileged group position and should elicit negative evaluation. In addition, according to prejudice perspectives and much of the data presented below, whites' negative attitudes toward the black political movement reflect the learning of negative feelings and beliefs toward blacks in general.

Three specific analyses are undertaken. First, I analyze the degree of black-white polarization and differential change in reactions to the black political movement. Second, I assess whether attitudes toward the black political movement, net of the effects of prejudice, are related to two theoretically prior group conflict attitudes (perceptions of conflicting group objectives and fraternal deprivation), and to general beliefs about the legitimacy of social protest. Third, I consider the impact of attitudes toward the black political movement on applied policy preferences. I review previous findings on attitudes toward the black political movement and consider recent theoretical interpretations of such questions, which treat them as a form of racial prejudice. Finally I propose that a more

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complete understanding of attitudes toward the black political movement requires the recognition that they also involve an instrumental concern with protecting group status and position.

Prejudice and the Black Political Movement

The empirical literature on trends in racial attitudes is sizable (Hyman and Sheatsley 1956; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985; Taylor, Greeley, and Sheatsley 1978). Issues of power, inequality, and conflict occupy only a limited place in these studies; generally the studies focus on people's attitudes toward integration, nondiscriminatory practices, and related policies (Marx 1967 is an exception). This delimited set of issues has two shortcomings. The first is a tendency to neglect the role of political conflict in shaping public opinion on racial issues. The second is a tendency to examine only the attitudes of whites. Blacks are not passive players in American race relations; careful comparisons of similarities and differences in white and black attitudes can be illuminating (Pettigrew 1985; Schuman et al. 1985).

The existing research on white attitudes toward the black political movement has found those attitudes to be negative. Campbell writes: "White response to the black protest movement . . . was generally unfavorable, a majority believing it to be pushing too fast and too violently and with hurtful consequences" (1971, p. 139). This conclusion was suggested earlier by Sheatsley: "Whites generally disapprove of direct action by Negroes and would welcome relief from racial tensions" (1966, p. 234). Similarly, Schwartz observed: "There are important reservoirs of resistance to the actions of the civil rights movement among all population groups considered" (1967, p. 111).

One attempt to move beyond these largely descriptive analyses comes from the work on symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay 1982). This perspective contends that early in life many whites acquire negative feelings toward blacks. This disposition becomes linked with other acquired values (e.g., hard work, obedience); the resulting blend of antiblack affect and traditional moral values becomes the basis for opposition to political policies, such as school busing, that are favorable to blacks. Efforts to test the theory of symbolic racism operationalize this

new form of prejudice with survey questions about black political activism and influence (Sears and Allen 1984; Sears and Kinder 1985), which then are used to predict attitudes toward busing or intention to vote for a black mayoral candidate. Sociologists concerned with white attitudes toward affirmative action (Kluegel and Smith 1986) also treat such questions as indicators of generalized racial sentiments. Thus the survey research literature has shifted from paying little attention to attitudes toward the black political movement or offering descriptive analyses to a grounding in a theory of prejudice and psychological predispositions.

Group Conflict and Attitudes toward the Black Political Movement

Questions about the black political movement, however, address real, often conflictual, and historically important efforts to reduce socioeconomic and political inequalities between blacks and whites. For that reason questions about the pace of racial change, evaluations of black political activists, and, to a lesser degree, the tactics employed by blacks are likely also to tap concern with political challenges to the racial status quo. Attempts to understand how group interests and conflicts are expressed in racial attitudes have built on Blumer's (1958) notion of the sense of group position (Bobo 1983; Smith 1981; Wellman 1977). Conflict attitudes generally are concerned with the distribution of scarce values and resources between social groups as well as with attempts to affect the process and patterns of distribution. Three specific types of group conflict attitudes are described below: 1) perceptions of conflicting group objectives; 2) perceptions and evaluations of relative group standing, termed "fraternal deprivation"; and, most important, 3) perceived threats or evaluations of those who are exerting active pressure to change group relations.

Perceptions of conflicting group objectives involve a belief that groups have opposing goals with respect to economic, political, or status-related outcomes (Allport 1954, pp. 229-32; Jackman and Jackman 1983, pp. 58-68). The scope of these conflicts may vary greatly. At the low end, groups may share a near-identity of sociopolitical goals, values, and basic social identities (e.g., national allegiance). At a modest level of conflicting

objectives, groups disagree on a range of sociopolitical goals but share many values and identities. Black-white relations are closest to this middle level. Conflict is most extreme when opposing group objectives cut across the full range of sociopolitical attitudes, values, and social identities. Fraternal deprivation involves perceptions and evaluations of comparative group standing along the dimensions of economic chances in life, political influence, and social prestige (Vaneman and Pettigrew 1972). A direct expression of discontent with the position of a person's membership group relative to an out-group is an indicator of fraternal deprivation. Perceived threat involves perceptions and evaluations of social groups or organized members of a group who are pressuring explicitly for change that might be beneficial to in-group members or harmful to out-group members. Attitudes toward the black political movement should tap these feelings of perceived threat.¹ Whether any or all of these types of attitudes have a realistic basis is an empirical question.

It is useful to think of these attitudes as following a logical order. People must have some underlying sense of conflicting group goals before they react negatively to group inequality or to any specific political actors (Dahrendorf 1959; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981). Hence conflict attitudes begin with perceptions of conflicting group objectives, which themselves arise from a combination of structured group inequality and positive group identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Before the source of a pressure for change is evaluated negatively, dominant group members must feel that their group is falling behind or is in jeopardy of losing ground to a rival group. Feelings of fraternal deprivation thus intervene between perceptions of conflicting group objectives and perceived threat. Subordinate-group members who have a sense of deprivation relative to dominant-group members will evaluate posi-

tively those who are pushing for changes beneficial to their group. Among the group conflict attitudes, perceived threat has the most potent influence on group-relevant policy preferences because political activists are key figures in defining the possible policy choices.

The principal difference between group conflict attitudes and prejudice lies in the cognitive bases of the attitudes (Williams 1964). Prejudice involves negative emotional feelings toward a group and its members, feelings that involve rigidly held and inaccurate stereotypes (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1982; Seeman 1981). These attitudes are rooted in the affective or expressive needs of individuals (Williams 1964) or result from cognitive biases in information processing (Pettigrew 1982).

These two types of attitudes are related but distinguishable (Williams 1964). Yet the concept of prejudice includes both attitudes directed toward the protection of group position and those that represent more of a self-contained psychological state. When the label "prejudice" is applied to both group-interested attitudes and to generalized feelings of disliking, unfortunately, the result is a single conceptual designation for attitudes that are different in character and in formation process. An analogy to social class attitudes can clarify the proposed distinction. A form of class prejudice is reflected in extreme and plainly categorical beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) held by the middle and the upper classes about those lower in class standing (e.g., "working-class people lack ambition" or "poor people are unable to postpone gratification or plan for the future"). Upper-class hostility toward unions, however, is conceptualized appropriately as a conflict attitude. Such attitudes involve evaluations of real social actors who are seeking to alter the concrete distribution of goods and values between groups with differing interests.

Both group conflict attitudes and prejudice contribute to relevant outcomes such as racial policy attitudes or to intergroup behaviors (e.g., Begley and Alker 1982). Both types of attitudes have a basis in the prior history and current organization of group life, but prejudice is rooted in an underlying psychological antipathy and in stereotyping, whereas conflict attitudes arise from a concern with protecting group position. Recognizing this distinction makes it possible to identify appropriate indicators of each type of attitude,

¹ This conceptualization of threat is based on the racial attitude literature and the political tolerance literature. Hyman (1972) suggested that the sharp polarization in blacks' and whites' responses to questions about the pace of civil rights protest indexed the "root of conflict" between the races. Political tolerance research ranging from Stouffer's classic book (1955) to work by McClosky and Brill (1983) and by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) measures perceived threat by obtaining respondents' evaluations of key political groups.

to examine hypotheses about likely relationships between these attitudes, and to assess their possible outcomes (Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972).

HYPOTHESES

On the basis of the preceding conceptualization of group conflict attitudes and of prejudice, several hypotheses about attitudes toward the black political movement can be formulated. First, there should be substantial black-white differences in reactions to the black political movement. Second, there should be differential patterns of change over time by race. Each group should respond in a strategic, instrumental manner to shifts in the political context (Paige 1970). When black protest activity is high and is increasing, blacks should evaluate the black political movement positively. During such times whites should evaluate the movement negatively. When black protest is low and is decreasing, however, black evaluations should reflect a call for further action whereas white attitudes should become more moderate.

There is a real structural basis for expecting these patterns of difference in view of previous and continuing racial economic inequality (Farley 1984), residential segregation (Taeuber 1983), and black underrepresentation in conventional political institutions (Joint Center for Political Studies 1982). Moreover, these predictions have a concrete historical basis in changes in the level and timing of black activism and in the accomplishment of some key movement objectives. After 1968 there was a sharp and largely continuous decline both in more moderate forms of protest (e.g., nonviolent demonstrations) and in more extreme forms (e.g., rioting) by blacks (see Burstein 1979 for data on the frequency of protest actions; Smith 1980 for data on the public's rating of civil rights as a national problem). The 1954 Brown decision, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 served to eliminate *de jure* segregation and discrimination. These and other legal-political changes essentially secured blacks' "procedural" or citizenship rights but did not eliminate racial segregation, discrimination, or inequality.²

² Detailed elaboration of the historical trends and events that might affect attitudinal responses is beyond

Could these expectations have been derived from a prejudice perspective? It is difficult to derive predictions for blacks' attitudes on the basis of prejudice theories because such theories typically are concerned with the attitudes of dominant group members, not those of subordinate group members. Thus for the present purposes, prejudice theories do not provide clear guidance for developing expectations regarding the attitudes of blacks toward the black political movement.³

The conceptual distinction made between conflict attitudes and prejudice stresses that the former are linked to perceptions about group position, whereas the latter involves negative intergroup feelings and stereotypes. The expectation that whites' attitudes toward black activism will improve as the level of protest activity declines suggests that these racial attitudes have both a group-interested intent and a real informational-experiential basis. These are not traits generally credited to prejudiced attitudes. To be sure, theories of prejudice usually recognize a kernel of truth in prejudiced attitudes and acknowledge that overt conflict can increase the verbal and behavioral expression of prejudice. Still, substantial change in attitudes toward the black political movement corresponding to real contextual change would indicate both a less extreme character and a less central emotional basis for such attitudes.

Concerning the conflict attitudes themselves, fraternal deprivation and perceptions

the scope of this paper. In addition, it is inappropriate to the hypotheses that can be examined with the available data. Attitude questions designed for use in major national surveys such as the NES, with the possible exception of reactions to particular political candidates, typically are worded so as to have relevance and meaning in all parts of the country and at more than one point in time. Thus, like most other attitude questions in such surveys, the black political movement attitude items are not intended to index reactions to single events, short-term conditions, or highly localized circumstances. Instead, like the hypotheses developed above, they address broad general features of the political context.

³ Schuman and Harding (1964, p. 371) contend that "bias in favor of as well as against ethnic groups must be considered." The data at hand are not suited to the sort of carefully balanced analysis that Schuman and Harding undertook, in which "irrational pros" and "irrational antis" can be found. Even so, the expectations for change embody the assumption that people are responding to information and events. If attitudes should prove reasonably responsive to the frequency and intensity of black protest activity, some degree of instrumental responsiveness to the ebb and flow of real-world events can be imputed.

of conflicting group objectives should be interrelated positively. Both of these attitudes, in turn, should be related positively to feelings of perceived threat. As a distinct set of attitudes that are not reducible to prejudice, relationships among the conflict attitudes themselves should occur net of the effects of other background and attitudinal attributes of the respondent. In addition, blacks' historic reliance on protest to achieve political and economic goals suggests that a concern with group standing (fraternal deprivation) and evaluations of black activists (perceived threat) will be related to general beliefs about the desirability and legitimacy of social protest (Jeffries, Turner, and Morris 1971). Furthermore, by this logic, beliefs about social protest should be related to fraternal deprivation and to attitudes toward the black political movement independent of basic intergroup feelings.

Both theories of prejudice and theories of group conflict treat basic intergroup feelings as an important variable. Whether the basis of intergroup attitudes is thought to reside in the structure of group privilege and position or in the acquisition of negative feelings and beliefs, an awareness of the group boundary is invoked. Prejudice theories typically maintain that affective hostility toward blacks as a group is a central component of negative responses to the black political movement. The group conflict approach maintains that ethnocentrism—in the sense of positive in-group differentiation from the out-group—is more important (Bobo 1988). Positive in-group differentiation, however, can lead to out-group derision and dislike (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Williams 1964). Thus specifying sharp empirical boundaries between the two is a problematic task. Yet to the extent that whites express clear affective hostility toward blacks and that such feelings are related to attitudes toward the black political movement, the latter involves a significant component of prejudice. To the extent that whites do not express clear affective hostility toward blacks but do make an affective distinction between themselves and blacks (i.e., positive in-group distinctiveness as opposed to strong out-group hostility; see Tajfel 1982) that is related to their attitudes toward the black political movement, an ethnocentrism-conflict interpretation is more appropriate.

The group conflict attitudes, especially

attitudes toward the black political movement, should contribute to opposition to policies aimed at improving the status of blacks. Again, these effects should occur net of indicators of basic intergroup feelings.

DATA AND MEASURES

For the analysis of black-white differences in patterns of change, data are taken from the 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1976, and 1980 National Election Studies (NES), conducted by the Institute for Social Research (ISR). In addition, data from the 1974 Fall Omnibus Survey, also conducted by ISR, are used (for fuller details about these studies see ICPSR 1982). These studies involved multi-stage area probability samples of adults living in the coterminous United States. In order to assure comparability of sample populations across years, the analysis has been restricted to respondents 21 years of age or older. Eighteen- to 20-year-olds were not included regularly in the NES until 1970. The full wording of questions is reported in Table 1 and discussed in the results section below.⁴

The principal measures used in the correlational analysis, all of which are taken from the 1972 NES, are as follows (see Appendix for actual wording unless otherwise indicated):

1) An indicator of perceptions of conflicting objectives ("Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology") is created by subtracting respondents' rating of the political ideology of blacks from their rating of whites' ideology (each rating is based on a seven-point scale running from extremely liberal to extremely conservative). These questions explicitly ask the respondent for a judgment of whites' and blacks' general group tendencies in political orientation.

2) A fraternal deprivation measure ("Group Political Deprivation") is created by adding two items: one concerns whether blacks have

⁴ "Don't Know" responses are generally low—around five percent or less—and are excluded from the analysis of the nonthermometer items reported below. "Don't Knows" were coded to 50.0 on all thermometer items (again, the level of "Don't Know" responses is quite low and does not change systematically over time). The trend tests are performed using logistic regression as implemented with the GLIM program (Baker and Nelder 1978). Fienberg (1980) provides a general discussion of logit analysis; Schuman et al. (1985, pp. 217–27) give specific applications for trend tests.

Table 1. Wording of Trend Questions Concerning The Black Political Movement and Intergroup Affective Orientations

Black Political Movement

1. *Civil Rights Push*: Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving at about the right speed?
2. *Actions Violent*: During the past year or so, would you say that most of the actions black people have taken to get the things they want have been violent, or have most of these actions been peaceful? (Volunteered "Pro-con/some violent, some peaceful" responses accepted.)
3. *Actions Hurtful*: Do you think the actions black people have taken have, on the whole, helped their cause, or on the whole hurt their cause? (Volunteered "Pro-con/Helped, Hurt some" responses accepted.)
4. *Civil Rights Progress*: In the past few years we have heard a lot about civil rights groups working to improve the position of black people in this country. How much real change do you think there has been in the position of black people in the past few years: a lot, some, or not much at all?
5. *Civil Rights Leaders*: (The standard National Election Study thermometer for feelings toward civil rights leaders. Ranges from 0-97. Don't Know scored 50.0.)
6. *Black Militants*: (The standard NES thermometer for feelings toward black militants. Ranges from 0-97. Don't Know scored 50.0.)

Intergroup Affective Orientations

7. *Blacks*: (The standard NES thermometer for feelings toward blacks. Ranges from 0-97. Don't Know scored 50.0.)
8. *Whites*: (The standard NES thermometer for feelings toward whites. Ranges from 0-97. Don't Know scored 50.0.)

too much, about the right amount, or too little political influence; the other, using the same response format, asks about protestors. Again, the introduction to these questions explicitly asks respondents to assess the influence of social groups. This measure differs from other efforts to tap fraternal deprivation. The comparison group is not specified explicitly in the question, but whites are the culturally and historically relevant comparison group (Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972; Williams 1975). The component items focus on political influence rather than on economic position (Kluegel and Smith 1986). The measure is a useful indicator of realistic fraternal deprivation in view of blacks' historic reliance on political means to achieve economic progress for the group and the generally greater political component to racial conflict in recent years (Wilson 1980).

3) An indicator of perceived threat ("Anti-Black Political Movement") is created by standardizing five items and then assigning an average score across these items. Three of these items are shown in Table 1:1, "Civil Rights Push," 5, "Civil Rights Leaders," and 6, "Black Militants." Two additional items, not available in other years, are available in the 1972 NES and ask for evaluations of black political activists (a feeling thermometer for "Urban Rioters" and for "Ministers Who Lead Protests"). The "Actions Violent" and "Actions Hurtful" items are not included

in this scale because of their primarily tactical (as opposed to strategic) content.

4) General orientation toward social protest ("Disapprove Social Protest") is measured by a three-item scale. The three items assess approval or disapproval of protesting with a permit, protesting in defiance of an unjust law, and protest that disrupts the government. None of these questions explicitly mentions race.

5) A scale of opposition to government action ("Oppose Government Action") on racial issues is created by adding two items: one concerns federal efforts to prevent job discrimination; the other concerns federal efforts to ensure school integration (see Jackman 1978).

6) It is important to determine whether the relationship among the group conflict attitudes and the effects of these attitudes on racial policy preferences are significant, net of the effects of other relevant attitudinal and background characteristics of the respondent. Two indicators of basic intergroup feelings, or prejudice, are used. The first ("Affective Differentiation") is a difference score between feelings towards whites and feelings toward blacks, based on the thermometer questions. The second ("Segregationism") is composed of an item on whites' rights to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods and an item on general support for segregation (see Bobo 1983 and Jackman 1978 for previous use).

These "old-fashioned" racism items involve a basic recognition of group boundaries and feelings of social distance; thus they logically precede the group conflict attitudes. The literature points to another important variable, political ideology ("Political Conservatism"), which is measured by the respondent's self-placement on a seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal through middle-of-the-road to extremely conservative. As a fundamental orientation toward the political environment, political ideology is treated as prior to the group conflict attitudes. Political conservatives should score higher than liberals on each of the conflict attitudes and on the opposition to government action measure. Finally, I also use background controls for age, years of education, and region (a dummy variable with "South" scored 1 and non-Southern states scored 0). In light of much previous research, we expect Northern, younger, and better-educated respondents to express more positive racial attitudes than their Southern, older, less-well educated counterparts.⁵

RESULTS

Black-White Polarization and Differential Patterns of Change

As a result of group conflict processes and anti-black prejudice, blacks and whites should differ sharply in their reactions to the black political movement and should undergo differential change in response to changes in the political context of black-white relations.

⁵ Cronbach's alphas for the scales used in the regression models are as follows: Group Political Deprivation (two items) .56; Anti-Black Political Movement (five items) .81; Disapprove Social Protest (three items) .62; Segregationism (two items) .65; and Oppose Government Action (two items) .64. The weaker reliability of the Group Political Deprivation measure does not appear to present a problem for the present research. Each of the component items correlates in the same direction and in roughly the same magnitude (plus or minus less than one-tenth of a point) with six (Age, Education, Political Conservatism, Disapprove Social Protest, Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology, and Anti-Black Political Movement) of the nine variables used in later regression analyses. The blacks' influence item and the protestors' influence item show significant positive relationships with the prejudice measures and region, but in each case that relation is stronger for the blacks' influence item (.29 versus .12 for the relation to Affective Differentiation and to Segregationism and .21 versus .08 for region).

Table 1 shows the questions used to address this hypothesis. Six of these questions explicitly concern the black political movement: the first four ask whether the civil rights movement has pushed too fast ("Civil Rights Push"), has taken steps that have been helpful or hurtful ("Actions Hurtful"), has been largely violent or peaceful ("Actions Violent"), or has achieved any real change ("Civil Rights Progress"). The next two questions are standard NES thermometer items that tap feelings on a scale ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 100 toward "Civil Rights Leaders" and toward "Black Militants." The last two questions, also thermometer items, are measures of intergroup affective orientation toward "Blacks" and toward "Whites." These items are included because they provide information about group cohesion and because they will be used to assess the degree of correlation between black political movement attitudes and intergroup affective orientations.

Table 2 presents the percentages by year and race for the polar response options for the questions introduced in Table 1, but omits the percentage that offers any intermediate response (the percentage offering such responses can be derived by adding the polar response options and subtracting the sum from 100%). Large absolute percentage differences between blacks and whites are evident for the 1960s. For example, 75 percent of whites in 1964 thought the civil rights movement was pushing too fast as compared to only nine percent of blacks, a difference of 69 percent. Similarly, in the same year, 70 percent of whites thought the actions blacks had taken were mostly violent; this figure compares with only 17 percent among blacks for a difference of 53 percent.

Between 1964 and 1974 blacks' responses to Actions Violent and Actions Hurtful underwent little meaningful change. By substantial margins blacks consistently viewed the actions of black leaders as "peaceful" and "helpful." Whites, in contrast, underwent a remarkable transformation, shifting from a predominant feeling in the 1960s that blacks' actions were violent and hurtful to a clear majority view in the 1970s that blacks' actions were peaceful and helpful. On the Actions Violent question whites' responses move a full 36 percent in a positive direction but undergo a similar shift of 29 percent for

Table 2. Trends for Questions on the Black Political Movement and Intergroup Affective Orientations, by Race

Race	Questions and Responses	Year and Percentage								Last Minus First	
		1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1980		
	<i>Civil Rights Push</i>										
Black	% Too fast	9	22	8	6	11	7	6	6	-3	
	% Too slow	27	22	29	38	31	33	39	45	+18	
White	% Too fast	74	79	71	61	54	45	47	40	-34	
	% Too slow	3	3	4	6	5	5	5	9	+6	
	<i>Actions Violent</i>										
Black	% Violent	17	—	31	29	21	18	—	—	+1	
	% Peaceful	79	—	62	68	76	77	—	—	-2	
White	% Violent	70	—	79	68	50	35	—	—	-35	
	% Peaceful	26	—	18	28	48	62	—	—	+36	
	<i>Actions Hurtful</i>										
Black	% Hurtful	11	—	16	11	9	15	—	—	+4	
	% Helpful	86	—	77	86	85	78	—	—	-8	
White	% Hurtful	72	—	74	67	51	43	—	—	-29	
	% Helpful	24	—	22	27	45	53	—	—	+29	
	<i>Civil Rights Progress</i>										
Black	% A lot	60	41	59	40	45	45	32	—	-28	
	% None	9	11	8	13	7	9	17	—	+8	
White	% A lot	39	41	49	55	58	58	64	—	+25	
	% None	21	19	15	10	8	6	6	—	-15	
	<i>Civil Rights Leaders</i>										
Black	Mean score	—	—	—	80	77	77	74	75	-5	
White	Mean score	—	—	—	42	37	38	46	50	+8	
	<i>Black Militants</i>										
Black	Mean score	—	—	—	39	42	38	47	55	+16	
White	Mean score	—	—	—	11	16	14	23	27	+16	
	<i>Blacks</i>										
Black	Mean score	89	86	90	86	87	86	86	89	0	
White	Mean score	60	60	61	58	61	62	58	60	0	
	<i>Whites</i>										
Black	Mean score	59	72	67	63	64	74	67	77	+18	
White	Mean score	85	84	81	77	79	79	74	76	-9	

Note: The base Ns for blacks range from 120 to 415. The base Ns for whites range from 582 to 2210.

Actions Hurtful. This change, however, occurs after 1968, a point to be considered again below.

Similar results are found for more clearly strategic questions such as the Civil Rights Push item. The percentage of blacks saying that black leaders are moving too slowly rose 18 percent between 1964 and 1980. Although whites show a trend away from their early tendency to view the civil rights push as proceeding "too fast" (-34%), only a small percentage moved into the "too slow" response (+6%). Virtually all of the change among whites is limited to movement into the intermediate response of "about the right speed."

Blacks and whites also differ in their views of how much the black political movement

has accomplished. The percentage of blacks who said that "a lot" of progress was made was fairly high in the 1960s (around 60% despite some fluctuation), but declined to 32 percent. Most of the roughly 28 percent decline in this response moved into the "some" progress category, not into the very pessimistic response of "not much at all." Whites, in contrast, show a 25 percent increase in the percentage saying that "a lot" of progress was made. The evaluative implications of this particular item, however, are ambiguous. A person who says that "a lot" of progress was made could view this degree of progress as too little change, about the right amount, or too much. This ambiguity perhaps is responsible for the low correlation between this item and the other questions on the black

political movement. For example, the correlation between Civil Rights Push and Civil Rights Progress in 1972 is quite low ($r = .05$, $p < .05$) among whites; the correlation is larger among blacks ($r = .22$, $p < .05$). At least for whites, this question does not have the same evaluative implications as the Civil Rights Push item.

Blacks' evaluations of Civil Rights Leaders declined slightly (-5 points), while whites' evaluations improved ($+8$ points). Evaluations of Black Militants increased by 16 points among both blacks and whites. Blacks expressed more positive evaluations of both types of activists than did whites at each time point. Indeed, at no point did the average rating of Black Militants or Civil Rights Leaders among whites pass the neutral point of 50 degrees.

Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression tests for differential change by race on four of the black political movement items. For each of the four nonthermometer questions, there is a highly significant interaction between race and year (see Table 3, Row 4). The coefficient for year for blacks, when adjusted by the interaction term, is virtually zero for the Civil Rights Push, Actions Violent, and Actions Hurtful questions. Few blacks took the anti-black political movement responses on these items; change involves movement by whites out of these response categories. The coefficient for year, adjusted for the interaction term, is of roughly the same magnitude for blacks and for whites

on the Civil Rights Progress question, but has a different direction (negative for blacks and positive for whites). Blacks show movement away from the response that "a lot" of progress has been made, whereas whites say increasingly that "a lot" of progress has been made. All four questions show substantial racial differences in trends.

Are these changes simply part of general secular changes in racial attitudes? First, there is no single pattern of change characteristic of all racial attitudes (Schuman et al. 1985). Second, trends in whites' attitudes toward the black political movement behaved differently from their attitudes toward segregation, at least for the period 1964 to 1968. During this period there was no change on the Civil Rights Push or the Actions Hurtful items among whites, but there was a statistically significant increase in negative ("violent") responses on the Actions Violent item. These patterns differ from the significant positive movement that occurred in whites' support for the general principle of racial integration and equal treatment. During this period, white support for the principle of integrated schooling rose nine percent, from 64 percent to 73 percent. Similarly, white support for the principle of free residential choice for blacks rose eight percent, from 65 percent to 73 percent (Schuman et al. 1985, p. 75). Separate tests comparing trends from 1964 to 1968 on Civil Rights Push, Actions Violent, and Actions Hurtful to trends for a question

Table 3. Logit Linear Analysis of Race Differences in Trends for Black Political Movement Items¹

	Black Political Movement Items and Response Modeled			
	Civil Rights Push "Too Fast"	Actions Violent "Peaceful"	Actions Hurtful "Helpful"	Civil Rights Progress "A Lot"
Constant	8.48***	-12.89***	-11.02***	-5.86***
Race ²	-7.62***	14.97***	14.64***	11.36***
Year	-.11***	.18***	.15***	.08***
Race* Year	.07*	-.19***	-.18***	-.16***
Chi-square	114.50***	219.80***	91.96***	37.69***
d.f.	12	6	6	10
N	12,014	7,490	7,516	11,333
R-squared analog ³	.953	.817	.934	.901

¹ Only results for the model of best fit are presented. All models are estimated using the General Linear Interactive Modelling (GLIM) program (Baker and Nelder 1978). Models predict the log-odds of giving the response shown at the top of each column below the question label.

² Race is coded 1 for blacks and 0 for whites.

³ The R-squared analog statistic is the proportion of reduction in a baseline-model chi-square (a model fitting only the constant term) attributable to the model shown. It is calculated by subtracting the selected-model chi-square from the baseline-model chi-square and then dividing by the baseline-model chi-square.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

on residential segregation (see Appendix for wording) show significant interactions for each comparison.⁶

Group Conflict Attitudes, Prejudice, and Social Protest

Feelings toward blacks and the trend questions. How important a component of attitudes toward the black political movement are basic feelings toward blacks? If there is an important connection between the two, are the basic group feelings extreme or clearly hostile? An extensive examination of cross-tabulations shows that whites' feelings toward blacks, as measured by the thermometer item, are associated significantly with their responses to the Civil Rights Push, Actions Violent, and Actions Hurtful items (as it is with other racial attitudes questions; see Schuman et al. 1985). Yet these racial feelings are seldom extreme. For example, even poorly educated Southern whites who felt that the civil rights movement was pushing "too fast" had mean scores toward blacks above the 50-degree neutral point on the thermometer ($\bar{X} = 57$ in 1964 and $\bar{X} = 54$ in 1972).⁷ Also, the stability of the means on the thermometer of feelings toward blacks among whites (Table 2) suggests that *trends* on the Civil Rights Push, Actions Violent, and Actions Hurtful questions are not traceable to affect toward blacks.

Correlation of conflict attitudes, protest orientations, and prejudice. Do the conflict

attitudes cohere in ways that suggest an underlying concern with group political conflict and group position? How large a part does prejudice play in the conflict attitudes? The analysis conducted to answer these questions is based on data from the 1972 NES; it is restricted largely to the white respondents because fewer than 100 blacks had valid data across the full set of variables used in the regression analyses. Still, it is important to ascertain whether blacks and whites differ on the conflict attitude, social protest orientation, and racial policy attitude measures because such differences provide one indication of a group-interested basis to the attitudes. Significant black-white differences emerge on two of the three group conflict measures (the exception being Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology), on the social protest orientation measure, and on the measure of racial policy attitudes. Although reduced slightly, these differences remain even after controls are introduced for age, region, and education. Whites are more likely than blacks to feel that blacks and protestors have too much political influence (Group Political Deprivation), to evaluate the black political movement negatively (Anti-Black Political Movement), to believe that in general social protest is illegitimate (Disapprove of Social Protest), and to oppose federal intervention to protect the rights of blacks (Oppose Government Action).⁸

Are the group conflict attitudes related to one another and to social protest orientations? Do these relationships hold up after measures of prejudices are controlled? Table 4 presents zero-order correlations for the full set of variables used in later regression analyses. First, the three conflict attitudes have positive and significant intercorrelations. Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology has only a small correlation with Group Political Deprivation and with Anti-Black Political

⁶ The tests were performed in a logistic regression framework, with question (e.g., Civil Rights Push and the question on residential segregation), year of survey, and the interaction of question and year as independent variables. Adding the interaction term to a model specifying only main effects for question and year is a statistically significant improvement in fit for the Civil Rights Push comparison (improvement $\chi^2 = 17.87$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$), the Actions Violent comparison (improvement $\chi^2 = 40.60$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$), and the Actions Hurtful Comparison (improvement $\chi^2 = 13.27$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$).

⁷ These results are not an artifactual product of respondents' unwillingness to use the full thermometer response scale. Valid scores span the full range of possible scores, with a nontrivial 12.2 percent of whites rating blacks below the 50-degree neutral point in 1972. Expressions of strongly negative evaluations do occur with the thermometer items, but such expressions depend on the group in question. As Table 2 shows, mean scores in 1972 for white respondents on the Civil Rights Leaders ($\bar{X} = 37$) and Black Militants ($\bar{X} = 16$) thermometers are substantially below the neutral point, indicating that most respondents consider the full response scale.

⁸ I performed the tests using multiple regression with a dummy variable for race. The lack of a black-white difference on the Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology scale can be viewed as an indication of the validity of the measure. Although both blacks (+ .64) and whites (+ .56) tend to exaggerate the liberalism of blacks, the average perceived racial difference in political ideology is quite close to the observed racial difference (1.12) when we compare the scores of blacks and of whites on the self-placement item. Respondents of both races have a reasonably accurate sense of blacks' and whites' differing political objectives.

Table 4. Correlation Matrix for Regression Analyses of Group Conflict, Social Protest, Opposition to Government Action, and Attitudinal and Background Variables among Whites

Variables	Pearson Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations										N=980	
											Mean	S.D.
1. Racial Differences in Political Ideology											1.69	1.28
2. Group Political Deprivation	.17										4.78	2.46
3. Anti-Black Political Movement	.17	.54									-.07	.75
4. Disapprove Social Protest	.01	.37	.52								4.09	3.24
5. Affective Differentiation	.21	.29	.43	.22							15.54	20.40
6. Political Conservatism	.17	.33	.44	.38	.25						4.24	1.25
7. Segregationism	.18	.29	.39	.23	.39	.19					1.91	2.40
8. Oppose Government Action	.11	.27	.37	.29	.21	.27	.32				4.33	3.08
9. Age	.07	.18	.31	.34	.15	.20	.21	.09			42.88	16.39
10. Region	.18	.17	.17	.11	.19	.09	.26	.11	.03		.28	.45
11. Education	-.02	-.15	-.30	-.26	-.19	-.12	-.32	-.13	-.35	-.09	12.35	2.96
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

Movement (both approximately $.17$, $p < .001$). Group Political Deprivation and Anti-Black Political Movement, however, are correlated highly ($r = .54$, $p < .001$); this finding suggests that for many people negative evaluations of the black political movement reflect a concern with the political influence gained by blacks. Partialing out the effects of both Affective Differentiation and Segregationism reduces each of these correlations, but they all remain positive and statistically significant. Indeed, the relationship between Group Political Deprivation and Anti-Black Political Movement remains quite strong (partial $r = .41$, $p < .001$). Second, Disapprove Social Protest is correlated with Group Political Deprivation ($r = .37$, $p < .001$) and with Anti-Black Political Movement ($r = .52$, $p < .001$), but is not related to Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology ($r = .01$, n.s.). The correlations of Group Political Deprivation and Anti-Black Political Movement with Disapprove Social Protest are reduced only slightly by partialing out Affective Differentiation and Segregationism scores (the respective figures are partial $r = .25$, $p < .001$ for Group Political Deprivation and $.35$, $p < .001$ for Anti-Black Political Movement). Third, each of the conflict attitudes and the social protest orientation measures is related to Affective Differentiation and to Segregationism; the largest correlation among this set involves Affective Differentiation and the Anti-Black Political Movement scale ($r = .43$, $p <$

$.001$). These correlations show the diffuse and considerable effects of prejudice.

Comparison of prejudice and conflict attitude models. Other social and psychological factors that are found to influence racial attitudes, such as age, education, region, and political ideology, need to be considered. These factors may affect the conflict attitudes and may shed further light on the meaning of these attitudes to respondents. Thus the regressions reported in Table 5 allow us to assess the patterns of intercorrelation in the context of the full set of control variables. Models predicting separately each of the conflict attitudes and the racial policy attitudes are presented. With the exception of the first model, in which Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology is the dependent variable, two models are presented for each case. The first is a theoretical baseline model including only the attitudinal (Affective Differentiation, Segregationism, and Political Conservatism) and background (Age, Education, and Region) control variables. The second or full model then introduces the appropriate conflict attitude variables and the social protest orientation variable. Proceeding in this way helps to clarify how closely linked the conflict attitudes are, net of well-established correlates of racial attitudes, while also showing the relative importance of the control variables.

Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology: Both elements of group conflict and prejudice influence Perceived Racial

Table 5. Regression Analyses of the Relationship among Group Conflict Attitudes, Social Protest Orientation, Opposition to Government Action, and Control Variables among Whites

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables							
	Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology		Group Political Deprivation		Anti-Black Political Movement		Oppose Government Action	
	Base	Base	Full	Base	Full	Base	Full	
<i>Group Conflict Attitudes</i>								
Racial Difference in Political Ideology	—	—	.08**	—	.03	—	.02	
Group Political Deprivation	—	—	—	—	.29***	—	.05	
Anti-Black Political Movement	—	—	—	—	—	—	.17***	
<i>Social Protest Orientation</i>								
Disapprove Social Protest	—	—	.25***	—	.24***	—	.13***	
<i>Attitudinal Controls</i>								
Affective Differentiation	.13***	.14***	.12***	.24***	.18***	.06	.00	
Segregationism	.09**	.13***	.11***	.17***	.13***	.25***	.21***	
Political Conservatism	.11***	.25***	.17***	.31***	.16***	.20***	.09**	
<i>Background Controls</i>								
Age	.03	.07*	.01	.14***	.06*	-.02	-.08*	
Education	.07*	-.01	.01	-.11***	-.08**	-.01	.01	
Region (South = 1)	.12***	.09**	.06*	.04	.00	.01	-.01	
Adjusted R-square	.08	.19	.23	.38	.52	.15	.19	
N	980	980	980	980	980	980	980	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Differences in Political Ideology. Southern whites, to some extent those with greater education, political conservatives, and those who draw larger affective distinctions between blacks and whites are more likely to see blacks and whites as having different political objectives. The dependence of Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology on Affective Differentiation and Segregationism suggests an important element of prejudice in these perceptions. Simultaneously the lack of an effect of age, a positive rather than a negative effect of education, and regional differences despite controls for the types of racial attitudes and ideological factors that often differ between north and south suggest that both information and real differences in political context play a part in determining perceptions of differences in black and white political objectives.

Group Political Deprivation: Feelings of group political deprivation are tied to conflict and social protest attitudes as well as to prejudice. Comparing the baseline model to the full model, which includes Disapprove Social Protest and Perceived Racial Differ-

ences in Political Ideology, we can see, first, that both of the added variables have significant positive relationships to Group Political Deprivation net of the control variables. Adding Disapprove Social Protest and Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology to the model modestly increases the amount of variance explained from 19 percent to 23 percent, but most of this increase is due to the protest orientation measure.⁹ Second, the small positive effect of age on feelings of Group Political Deprivation seen in the baseline model is eliminated in the full model; this finding suggests that age differences in social protest orientations accounted for the earlier effect. Third, Southern whites, political conservatives, segregationists, and those

⁹ The connection between Group Political Deprivation and the general social protest orientation measure may be artificially high because one of the component items of the deprivation scale, the item on protestors, could be read as referring to many different types of protestors (e.g., anti-Vietnam war protestors). Thus we also performed these regressions using the single item on black political influence as a measure of fraternal deprivation. No noteworthy changes in results occurred.

who express an affective preference for whites over blacks are all more likely than their opposite counterparts to express a sense of Group Political Deprivation. Level of education is unrelated to Group Political Deprivation in both the baseline and the full models.

Anti-Black Political Movement: Evaluations of the black political movement involve a strong component of concern with group political influence and social protest and a strong component of prejudice toward blacks. The baseline model explains a substantial amount of the variance in this case (38%), but adding the antecedent conflict attitudes and the social protest orientation measure also produces the largest increment in variance explained (+14%). In particular, as the full model shows, Group Political Deprivation is the single strongest predictor of Anti-Black Political Movement scores, followed by Disapproval of Social Protest. Thus reactions to the black political movement involve a direct concern with black political influence and recourse to protest actions to attain that influence above and beyond the impact of affective preference for whites over blacks, segregationist attitudes, and general political conservatism. At the same time, each of the attitudinal control variables has significant effects on Anti-Black Political Movement scores, whereas one of the antecedent conflict attitudes—Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology—does not. Regional differences do not emerge in the baseline or the full model. Older and less well-educated respondents are more likely to give negative evaluations of the black political movement.

Consequences of Attitudes toward the Black Political Movement

Negative evaluations of the black political movement are an important factor in whites' opposition to policy changes designed to benefit blacks. The last two columns of Table 5 show that in the baseline model, only two variables—Segregationism and Political Conservatism—are related significantly to Opposition to Government action, but the model explains 15 percent of the variance in support for policies designed to protect the rights of blacks. Adding the conflict attitude and the social protest orientation measures increases the variance explained to 19 percent. This increase is attributable to the effects of two

variables, Anti-Black Political Movement and Disapprove Social Protest. Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology and Group Political Deprivation have no direct effects on Opposition to Government Action. Age, education, and region are unrelated to Opposition to Government Action in the baseline mode. A small negative effect of age, which is probably viewed most appropriately as only trivially different from zero, emerges in the full model. The results suggest that opposition to government actions beneficial to blacks is tied to conservative political ideologies and to support for segregation as well as to objections to the political activists and strategies that have put such policy considerations on the public agenda. Basic intergroup feelings had no direct effects, in either the baseline or the full model, on these applied racial policy attitudes.¹⁰

DISCUSSION

A person's attitudes toward the black political movement involve a large element of racial prejudice and a degree of conflict-based concern with group position. The following findings tend to support the conflict approach: 1) blacks are consistently more positive than whites in their reactions to the black political movement; 2) the trajectory of change on the black political movement items differs for blacks and for whites in ways that suggest instrumental adaptations to the changing political context; 3) the three conflict attitudes are interrelated positively, and the relationship between feelings of group political deprivation and negative evaluations of the black political movement are particularly strong; and 4) general orientations to social protest are related to evaluations of the black political movement net of key background and attitudinal (racial and nonracial) factors. Many blacks and many whites respond in an instrumental manner to the black political movement. The meaning of attitudes toward the black political movement among whites is linked explicitly to objections to social protest

¹⁰ The amount of variance explained for each dependent variable in Table 5 indicates that much is still unknown about their respective determinants. Also, in some cases the antecedent conflict attitudes do not bring as large an improvement in variance explained over the baseline model as anticipated, as in the effects of Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology on Group Political Deprivation.

and to the political influence wielded by blacks.

Yet the results also indicate limitations to the group conflict approach; blacks and whites do not confront one another as internally unified and externally hostile camps on racial issues. A significant number of whites express support for the black political movement. The degree of racial polarization on attitudes toward the black political movement lessened over time as the views of whites underwent moderation. Furthermore, a small fraction of the black population expresses negative evaluations of the movement. Also, the measure of Perceptions of Conflicting Group Objectives (Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology) was not correlated as highly with the other conflict attitudes as the proposed theory anticipated. This finding may reflect weakness in the particular measure used, which dealt only with political ideology; alternatively, it may underscore the delimited scope and the muted nature of black-white conflict in the United States. Most important, prejudice is a factor in how many whites react to the black political movement and respond to the other conflict attitudes. Had measures of stereotypes been available, they also might have affected reactions to the black political movement. Many whites who perceive black activism as threatening do so in part because they are prejudiced.

The need to understand public opinion on the black political movement is seen in the substantial net positive effect of anti-black political movement attitudes on opposition to government action to help blacks. Disapproval of social protest also increases a person's opposition to such policies. Here again, however, prejudice in the form of explicitly segregationist sentiment was a major influence on people's racial policy attitudes. Taken together, these results suggest that whites' resistance to government efforts to improve the status of blacks involves both a group-political conflict and the intrusion of individual-level prejudice on politics (Kinder and Sears 1981).

Future research should develop both direct and multiple-item measures of the conflict attitudes and of the components of prejudice (group feelings and stereotypes) in order to assess patterns of interrelationship and differential dependence on other factors. There is a need for data sets that allow for more detailed

analysis of blacks' attitudes and that include direct contextual data. This research infers responsiveness to real-world political events and conditions on the basis of change in attitudes associated with major shifts in the political context of race relations. This inference is reasonable because contemporary racial conflict often involves broad political dispute over rights and access to resources in addition to direct competition for jobs, housing, and the like (Wilson 1980). Such "politicized" racial conflict (Bobo 1983; Schuman et al. 1985) often is aimed at the federal government and originates with prominent black leaders and organizations; these disputes are conveyed to the public through the media. The public then is divided in its response to these disputes on the basis of race and concomitant patterns of identification, group feelings, and group interest. Therefore future research should pursue an integrated examination of data on actual movement actions, on the treatment of those actions by the media, and on the complex interweaving of prejudice and group conflict likely to be found in mass public opinion (Taylor 1986).

APPENDIX: WORDING OF QUESTIONS

1. *Political Conservatism*: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [Note: Don't know and haven't thought much about this scored 4.] Response Scale: 1. Extremely liberal; 2. Liberal; 3. Slightly liberal; 4. Moderate; 5. Slightly conservative; 6. Conservative; 7. Extremely conservative.

2. *Perceived Racial Differences in Political Ideology*: [Using the same introduction and response scale shown in number 1 above] A. Where would you place most white people? B. Where would you place most black people?

3. *Group Political Deprivation*: Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. On this card are three statements about how much influence a group might have. For each group I read to you, just tell me the number of the statement that best says how you feel. Protestors? Blacks? Response Scale [Note: Don't Knows scored 2]: 0. Too much influence (originally scored 1); 2. Just about the right amount of influence; 4. Too little influence (originally scored 3).

4. *Disapprove Social Protest*: A. How about taking part in protest meetings or marches that are permitted by the local authorities? Would you approve of taking part, disapprove, or would it depend on the circumstances? Response: 0. Approve (originally scored 1); 2. Depends (originally scored 3); 4. Disapprove (originally scored 5) B. How about refusing to obey a law which one thinks is

unjust, if the person feels so strongly about it that he is willing to go to jail rather than obey the law? Would you approve of a person doing that, disapprove, or would it depend on the circumstances? [Same response scale]. C. Suppose all other methods have failed and the person decides to try to stop the government from going about its usual activities with sit-ins, mass meetings, demonstrations, and things like that? Would you approve of that, disapprove, or would it depend on the circumstances? [Same response scale].

5. *Segregationism*: A. Which of these statements would you agree with: 4. White people have a right to keep black people out of their neighborhoods if they want to. (originally scored 1); 0. Black people have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like anybody else? (originally scored 5). B. What about you? Are you in favor of desegregation (originally scored 1); 2. Something in between (originally scored 3); 4. Segregation (originally scored 5).

6. *Oppose Government Action*: A. Some people feel that if black people are not getting fair treatment in jobs that the government in Washington ought to see to it that they do. Others feel that this is not the federal government's business. Have you had enough interest in this question to favor one side over the other? (If Yes) How do you feel? Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs or leave these matters to the states and local communities? Responses: 0. See to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs. (originally scored 1); 2. Depends, other volunteered response (originally scored 7) [Note: Don't Know and No Interest responses scored 2]; 4. Leave these matters to the states and local communities. (originally scored 5). B. Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to favor one side over the other? (If Yes) Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools or stay out of this area as it is not its business? Responses: 0. See to it that white and black children go to the same schools. (originally scored 1); 2. Depends, other volunteered response (originally scored 7) [Note: Don't Know and No Interest responses scored 2]; 4. Stay out of this area as it is not its business (originally scored 5).

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